Al Qaida in Syria Provides Wake Up Call

James J. Coyle: Al-Qaida in Syria provides wake up call

By JAMES J. COYLE / For the Register

Published: Dec. 12, 2013 Updated: 5:28 p.m.

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Dozens of Americans have tried to join Islamist rebel groups in Syria, according to U.S. officials. They sought to join the estimated 6,000 to 8,000 foreign fighters.

Approximately 2,000 of their number are European. It is easy for these foreign fighters to reach Syria: international flights bring them to Turkey, where there are training camps exclusively for European recruits. From there, they easily slip across the border. Such numbers are troubling, because they represent a serious threat to the West when they return from their jihad in the Middle East.

The threat is not only to the West; Russia faces a similar problem. An Uzbek Salafist in Turkey uses the Internet to recruit in Europe, North America, Russia and Central Asia, according to EurasiaNet. Radical Kyrgyz in Moscow were recruited for the struggle by North Caucasians. Members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have left their fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan to go to Syria. While the number of Central Asians is still small, they have become more prominent in jihadist groups like al-Qaida affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra. One press report says the “most dangerous and barbaric” of the al-Qaida fighters are 250 Chechens in the suburbs of Aleppo.

The group with the largest number of fighters is the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams, also known as ISIS. This group has achieved notoriety for fighting as much against other rebels as against government forces. They recently seized the northern Syrian town of Termanin from a rival rebel unit, by seizing the bakery, intimidating the police and beheading those who opposed them. “The executions are designed to make maximum impact,” said activist Firas Ahmad. Jihadists have also kidnapped Kurdish rebel fighters and Orthodox nuns. Most recently, the U.S. government announced on Thursday that they were suspending delivery of non-lethal aid to rebels in Northern Syria because of the reports of the Islamists' seizure of territory from the Free Syrian Army.

The ISIS now control many of the supply lines by which Western powers are trying to resupply other rebel groups. In areas along the border with Turkey in Aleppo and Idlib, the ISIS is also seizing territory held by other hard-line Islamist units, reports the Lebanese Daily Star. Their commander, who goes by the nickname al-Jazaeri, said they had learned their lesson in other conflicts. “Our mistake as mujahidin is that we were preoccupied with fighting [Moammar] Gadhafi and did not pay enough attention to how to hold onto territory,” he told Reuters.

The result is a large swath of territory in the heart of the Middle East under the control of al-Qaida affiliated groups. This area has come to resemble Afghanistan: Islamic schools, training camps and burka-clad women. The threat from these groups, many identified as terrorist organizations, is a common thread that unites Russia and America going into the Jan. 22 Geneva conference talks. The superpowers had appeared to be waging a proxy war in Syria, with Russia and Iran supporting President Bashar al-Assad against rebels backed by the United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Recent meetings, however, show that these alignments are no longer true.

The U.S. accepted Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's suggestion of foregoing military action in favor of Syria's decommissioning of its chemical weapons stockpile. With indications that the Dec. 31 deadline for the removal of 30 tons of chemicals might not be met because the road to the coast might not be safe for transport, there are no renewed American threats. Instead, quiet diplomacy seems the order of the day.

Last week, British and American officials met in Ankara with non al-Qaida Islamist groups. While refusing to name which groups with which he had met, Army Gen. Martin Dempsey said it was important to learn the long-term plans of the organizations. Other officials said the purpose of the meeting was to encourage them to join in the Geneva II peace talks. It would appear that the al-Qaida threat is uniting the international community in unanticipated ways.

James J. Coyle is a professor and the director of Global Education at Chapman University and Chair of the Eurasian Committee of� the Pacific Council on International Policy.� He has been involved with Middle� Eastern affairs for over 30 years.

Putin leaves Azerbaijan With Limited Improvements

Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled to Azerbaijan in August 2013 to enhance Russian interests in the near abroad.  He was accompanied by six key ministers, including the Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov.

The visit was surrounded by rumors.  Leonid Gusev, senior research fellow of the Institute of International Studies, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, focused on the inclusion of the defense minister.  "Why take Shoigu with you?  Because recently there was information that Azerbaijan and Turkey will create a unified army, and Georgia may join as well.  I think that the leadership of Russia wants to find out what it is, because you understand that Turkey is a NATO country."  Gusev's sources were remarks from Azerbaijani parliamentarian Zakhid Orudzh and Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Alasania.

Gusev's imaginings were quickly dismissed by Azerbaijani parliamentarian and political scientist Rasim Musabekov.  "There are issues in the military area that should be discussed," he said.  "It is not just military cooperation.  It is very important to consider issues that may affect Azerbaijan, such as the situation on the Caspian Sea where military activity has been gaining momentum; there is also the Iranian context, Middle East events and, most importantly, the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  It is difficult to imagine the settlement of this conflict without Russia."

The Armenians also reacted negatively, convinced that the meeting would result in closer ties between Russia and Azerbaijan.  "Naturally, any bilateral relationship between our enemy and partner states cannot fail to worry us," said the chairman of the Armenian parliamentary committee on foreign relations.  "Azerbaijan is ready to exploit its relationship with any state for painting a distorted picture of its actions in the region."  Similarly, Armenian opposition leaders sounded the alarm.  Armenian National Congress spokesman Vladimir Karapetian said, "These are very worrisome developments for Armenia.  We must be prepared for further developments, especially in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process."  Gior Manoyan of the Dashnaks criticized the Russian president, stating the visit was "not an ally's behavior."

The Armenians need not have worried.  Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev tried to enlist Putin's cooperation on the issue.  "Azerbaijan would like to see Russia as a referee," he said.  "The occupation of Azerbaijani land has continued for more than two decades.  What could be demolished has been demolished.  Twenty percent of our territory is occupied; the U.N. resolutions remain on paper."  In reply, Putin responded with a bland statement that any solution would have to be political.  "I want to stress that Russia is actively facilitating the search for the fastest conflict resolution, which is only attainable by peaceful means," he said.

Relations between the two countries have been strained over the past year.  Against Russia's wishes, Baku cancelled its use of the Baku-Novorossysk pipeline because it was uneconomical, and Russia cancelled its lease of the Gabala radar station rather than pay the rent Azerbaijan was demanding.  Despite these setbacks, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov insisted the relationship had been neither affected nor deteriorated. 

Emphasizing the good relations between the two countries, President Aliyev highlighted the growing defense cooperation between them.  He said that Azerbaijan was among the top buyers of Russian arms and other military equipment, and the defense relationship was already worth $4 billion dollars.  This defense cooperation was highlighted by a visit of the Russian warship the Dagestan.

Missing from the summit’s summary were any agreements for Azerbaijan to join in Russian initiatives such as the Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area (CISFTA), Eurasian Economic community (EurAsEC), or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTAO-Azerbaijan allowed its membership to lapse in 1999)

The two presidents discussed the legal status of the Caspian Sea, a long-running dispute with ramifications for the underwater deposits of oil and gas there.    Putin described the discussion to reporters:  “During the talks we paid a lot of attention to the issues of the Caspian region,” reported Radio Liberty.  “There really are a very great number of unresolved problems, including security, border delimitation, preservation of biological diversity of the Caspian Sea, etc.  We have a vested interest in seeing all of these issues solved.”  In the past, Russia has used these issues to demand a veto over Azerbaijani proposals to build a Trans Caspian Pipeline.  No progress appears to have been made on these issues.

There were some positive results from the meeting.  The Russkiy Mir Foundation reported that a document on cooperation between emergency ministries was signed, as well as intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in air search and rescue, on the construction of a road bridge over the river that marks the border between the two countries, and a humanitarian cooperation program.

More importantly, Rosneft chief Igor Sechin signed an agreement with State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) cheif Rovnag Abdullaev.  The two CEOs pledged to cooperate on unspecified joint projects.  Sechin told reporters these would include "reciprocal deliveries, swap operations and opportunities for the use of joint infrastructure."  Rosneft subsequently released a statement that, "The companies agreed to cooperate in marketing and trading operations for hydrocarbons and petroleum products as well as jointly operate certain infrastructure facilities, such as pipelines and terminals."

In the end, both Azerbaijan and Russia emphasized the agreements that were signed, and labeled the visit a success.  On balance, however, when one balances what was achieved with the issues that were left unresolved, one can only conclude that Putin left empty-handed.  The summit meeting, Putin's first visit to Baku in seven years, was a lost opportunity.

Possible Political Implications of Russian decision to cancel Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline agreement

Russia is terminating the Northern Route Export Pipeline, running from Baku, Azerbaijan to Novorossiysk, Russia.  This oil pipeline, which stretches 1,330 kilometers (830 miles) at one time was considered an important national interest for both countries.  Today, it is considered a pipeline to be filled only if the economic conditions warrant it.

In 1994, when the government of Azerbaijan signed the "Contract of the Century" with Western oil companies to exploit offshore energy deposits, the United States opposed any proposal that would give Russia control over the export route.  But in February 1995, at a confidential meeting with the heads of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC, a BP-led consortium), President Heydar Aliyev directed early oil to be exported via the northern route.  According to the former President of the AIOC, "There were to be no situations created by Baku that would actively alienate President Aliyev's political allies in Moscow...Preparatory work could also start on WER (Baku to Ceyhan), but not brought into full effect until such time as Russian contracts had been signed.  For President Aliyev it was in Azerbaijani national interests to be aligned with but not subordinate to a cooperative Russia."  (Adams, Terry D.  "Baku Oil Diplomacy and 'Early Oil,' 1994-1998: an external perspective," in Azerbaijan in Global Politics:  Crafting Foreign Policy.  Baku:  Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, 2009, 242-243).

One reason that this pipeline route was important was the same reason that the original consortium included the Russian oil company Lukoil; namely, to avoid a Russian challenge to Azerbaijan's right to take oil from the contested waters of the Caspian.  The strategy worked:  in May 1995 Russian Energy Minister Yuri Shafranik proposed that the flow be reversed in the pipeline which had previously brought Russian crude to Azerbaijan to be refined.  In February 1996 the intergovernmental agreement was approved.  AIOC would ship oil across the border into Russia, from where the Russian pipeline company Transneft would take it to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.  There, it would be mixed with Russian "Ural light"-blend oil for sale on the international market.

The original agreement called for 5 million tons (approximately 35 million bbls) of oil to go through the pipeline annually.  The pipeline could carry up to 10 million tons, so the agreement only called for the pipeline to be 50% full.  In fact, however, the quantities shipped were far less than that.  Azerbaijan averaged 2.5 million tons per year, with the quantity decreasing in recent years:  2.2 million tons in 2010, 2.06 million tons in 2011, 1.99 million tons in 2012.

Because of these decreased flows, discussion about discontinuing the export through this line has been around for at least a decade, according to Azerbaijan's Ambassador to Russia Polad Bulbuloglu.  In 2007, SOCAR took over from AIOC as the operator of the Azerbaijani side of the pipeline.  Almost immediately, SOCAR President Rovnag Abdullayev announced a continuation of the use of the pipeline, but at reduced levels.  SOCAR cited the loss of revenues from the mixing with Ural light as the reason (Ural light sells for approximately $4 per barrel less than the higher quality Azerbaijani crude).

In August 2008, possibly as a signal of their unhappiness, Transneft notified SOCAR of a temporary suspension of the transportation of Azerbaijan's oil, supposedly because of repair work on the pipeline. This was followed in May 2009 by a Russian proposal to alter the original transit agreement.  According to Russian Minister of Industry and Energy Sergey Shmatko, the agreement had become "old."  Shmatko wanted to see the quantity increased from the average 2.5 million tons per year to the originally conceived 5 million tons.  "It is necessary to make changes in the agreement and the draft of the revised agreement was sent to Azerbaijan.  We expect a response," said the minister.  Apparently, they did not get one as the oil volumes continued to drift downward.

In September 2012, SOCAR announced they were holding negotiations with the Russians as to how much oil would be transported through the pipeline.  SOCAR estimated the volume would be 1.6 million tons, a 20% drop from the already low level of 1.99 million.  The decrease was soon confirmed:  in January-March 2013, SOCAL exported 411,339 tons through the pipeline, a drop of 85,548 tons from the same time a year ago.  The volume decreased an additional 2.8% in April.

Faced with the declining volumes, and with Transneft already losing an estimated $50 million annually on pipeline maintenance, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev signed a decree on May 5, 2013 terminating the arrangement.  The Russians did not give any advance notice of the action, although the termination was legal.  The original intergovernmental agreement stated either side could cancel the arrangement with six months notice, and Russia agreed to honor the current agreement until the beginning of 2014.  Transneft spokesman Igor Demin stated the agreement was being cancelled because Azerbaijan had not honored the terms as to the quantity being shipped. He added that the shipments could be resumed in 2014 if a new agreement were negotiated.  "From January (2014) we will calculate the tariff based on real rates," he said.

Azerbaijan also chose to look at the issue from an economic viewpoint.  "There will be no problem with oil exports," said SOCAR's leader Abdullayev.  "We have the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan route, Baku-Supsa and a railway."  Abdullayev said he was ready to enter into negotiations with Transneft.  "The company will continue oil deliveries in case of economic suitability of new (contract) conditions for SOCAR.  In case of economic unsuitability, deliveries won't be implemented."  A separate report quotes Abdullayev saying, "This is a commercial decision and the matter has moved from the political perspective to the economic.  The State Oil Company understands the decision of the Russian side."

Both sides have gone out of their way to make the decision appear divorced from politics.  Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced the talks had already begun.  "Our respective energy agencies and companies are working on preparing a new intergovernmental agreement which will reflect current realities."  Similarly, the deputy chief of Azerbaijan's presidential administration, Novruz Mammadov, concurred that "the transportation of oil at the moment is simply not profitable to both parties in terms of economic and commercial viability..we accept the decision of the Russian Federation as perfectly normal."

SOCAR's Abdullayev is reviewing all options for the pipeline including the establishment of an oil quality bank in Novorossiysk, using the pipeline to transport oil from a third party, or even reversing the pipeline to its original orientation.  "Economic efficiency of all possible options may be considered," he said.  "There is enough time."

While economic considerations must play into the decision making, one is forced to ask:  Why now?  After all, the mixing with Ural light was included in 1995 in the original draft of the intergovernmental agreement.  And Azerbaijan has never sent more than 3 million tons through the pipeline since they began the northerly flow in 1996.  The conclusion, despite protests from both sides, is that Russia continues to ratchet up the pressure on Azerbaijan.

Russia has long tried to force Azerbaijan into a customs union or security treaty.  It has opposed Azerbaijan's claims to its territory in the Caspian (pending an all-party conference), supported Armenia against Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh, and announced construction of the South Stream pipeline to choke any attempt for Azerbaijan to ship its gas to Europe independently.  When the Russian lease ended on the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan demanded an increase in rent, Russia refused to renew the lease.  Instead, it announced it was increasing its troop presence in Armenia.  The cancellation of the Baku-Novorossiysk intergovernmental agreement appears to be yet another move to bring Baku back under Moscow's control.

Turkey's Pro Russian Polarity

In granting Gazprom the right to lay South Stream through Turkey's economic zone in the Black Sea, Ankara has taken its latest step in reversing a centuries' old policy of opposing Russian expansion.  The Ottoman Empire fought the Russian Empire twelve times in the 19th Century, and the Republic of Turkey was a major NATO member throughout the 20th Century.  Now, however, despite its continuing NATO membership, Turkey is realigning itself with its Northern neighbor.

In January 2012, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met with his Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.  The two held the second Joint Strategic Planning group meeting, in which members of the Russian and Turkish foreign ministries met to align their policies.  Lavrov expressed his view that bilateral relations between the countries were developing in a constructive and confident environment.  He also opined that the two countries could devise solutions to every problem.

Davutoglu was even more enthusiastic.  Noting that relations had moved from routine to one that included joint strategic planning, the Turkish Foreign Minister described the relationship as a "paradigmatic change" for the country.

Part of the willingness to support Russia is ideological:  Turkey has strained relations with America's ally Israel; it opposed the US invasion of Iraq; it does not support a military solution to the Iranian nuclear question.  More importantly, however, is Turkey's reliance on Russia as a source of energy.  Turkey imports almost 80% of the fossil fuels it consumes, and about 50% of that oil and gas comes from Russia.  According to energy analyst Emre Isleri, this means that Turkey has been acting against its own national interests by not diversifying its sources of energy.  The result is that Turkey has restricted its foreign policy options with over-dependency.  "This means you cannot act against Russian interests in your neighborhood.  For instance, you cannot solve the Nagorno-Karabagh issue, and you will have limited say on the future of Syria, Cyprus, Armenian genocide allegations, etc."