James J. Coyle: Blinders in Benghazi
Following the Sept. 11, 2012 attack on the American diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, senators have tried to find out who was responsible. Hillary Clinton, the outgoing U.S. secretary of state responded, with some heat, “What difference does it make?”
A report last week by the Senate Intelligence Committee answered that question: between 1998 and 2012, there were 273 significant attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel. It is therefore essential that our representatives abroad be protected if America’s interests are to be advanced.
What the intelligence committee found, although they did not put it in these words, is an echo of the findings of the 9/11 Commission: the attack could have been avoided and the principle reason why it was not was a failure of imagination. No one believed that an attack using commercial airplanes against New York City was possible, even though there were indications something similar was being planned; similarly in Benghazi, despite indications that our diplomatic personnel were in great danger, no one took steps to protect them. No one seriously anticipated such an attack.
A harsh judgment? The Senate found that in the months preceding the attack there were hundreds of analytic reports providing strategic warnings that militias intended to strike U.S. facilities in Libya. There were ten militia training camps surrounding Benghazi alone and some of them were training to attack Americans.
Despite the warning and 20 specific incidets against the compound or other international organizations in the area, the compound had to rely on a local militia for security, the 17 February Martyrs Brigade. Yet, when “the security team asked 17th February members to ‘provide cover’ for them … members refused, saying they preferred to negotiate with the attackers instead,” according to a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report.
Clearly, when the host government cannot provide security for our diplomatic compounds, the United States needs to rely on its own military, not on a “rent-a-mob” recruited from the back alleys of a third world city.
Ambassador Stevens recommended on June 6 that some sort of security team be established in Benghazi, a recommendation that was not acted upon. On July 9, he asked for the temporary assignment of additional security personnel. “The State Department never fulfilled this requested and … never responded to the request with a cable.” On Aug. 15, the Regional Security Officer expressed concern about the ability to defend the post, citing limitations in manpower, security measures, weapons, and support from the Libyan government. The State Department took no action to meet these concerns.
Even Ambassador Stevens seems to have erred. When AFRICOM head General Carter Ham read the results of the Aug. 15 review, he offered to extend the deployment of 16 special operations personnel assigned to the embassy, a DOD site security team. State Department had not requested the extension, and Ambassador Stevens declined General Ham’s offer less than a month before the fatal attack.
Until the United States government begins to imagine that the worse can happen and is willing to act on the warnings it received, there will be more disasters in the future. One can only hope there will not be another report outlining the government’s lack of imagination.
James J. Coyle, Ph.D., is director of Global Education at Chapman University and the chair of the Eurasian Members Committee of the Pacific Council on International Policy.
What the intelligence committee found, although they did not put it in these words, is an echo of the findings of the 9/11 Commission: the attack could have been avoided and the principle reason why it was not was a failure of imagination. No one believed that an attack using commercial airplanes against New York City was possible, even though there were indications something similar was being planned; similarly in Benghazi, despite indications that our diplomatic personnel were in great danger, no one took steps to protect them. No one seriously anticipated such an attack.
A harsh judgment? The Senate found that in the months preceding the attack there were hundreds of analytic reports providing strategic warnings that militias intended to strike U.S. facilities in Libya. There were ten militia training camps surrounding Benghazi alone and some of them were training to attack Americans.
Despite the warning and 20 specific incidets against the compound or other international organizations in the area, the compound had to rely on a local militia for security, the 17 February Martyrs Brigade. Yet, when “the security team asked 17th February members to ‘provide cover’ for them … members refused, saying they preferred to negotiate with the attackers instead,” according to a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report.
Clearly, when the host government cannot provide security for our diplomatic compounds, the United States needs to rely on its own military, not on a “rent-a-mob” recruited from the back alleys of a third world city.
Ambassador Stevens recommended on June 6 that some sort of security team be established in Benghazi, a recommendation that was not acted upon. On July 9, he asked for the temporary assignment of additional security personnel. “The State Department never fulfilled this requested and … never responded to the request with a cable.” On Aug. 15, the Regional Security Officer expressed concern about the ability to defend the post, citing limitations in manpower, security measures, weapons, and support from the Libyan government. The State Department took no action to meet these concerns.
Even Ambassador Stevens seems to have erred. When AFRICOM head General Carter Ham read the results of the Aug. 15 review, he offered to extend the deployment of 16 special operations personnel assigned to the embassy, a DOD site security team. State Department had not requested the extension, and Ambassador Stevens declined General Ham’s offer less than a month before the fatal attack.
Until the United States government begins to imagine that the worse can happen and is willing to act on the warnings it received, there will be more disasters in the future. One can only hope there will not be another report outlining the government’s lack of imagination.
James J. Coyle, Ph.D., is director of Global Education at Chapman University and the chair of the Eurasian Members Committee of the Pacific Council on International Policy.
