South Stream: Plans Still Premature

Russian President Vladimir Putin travelled to the town of Anapa on the coast of the Black Sea, to participate in the inauguration of the South Stream pipeline.  On December 7, 2012, the first two sections of the long-awaited, multinational, natural gas pipeline were welded together under the gaze of various industry leaders and heads of state.  This fulfilled Putin's December/January directive to Gazprom leader Alexey Miller that the pipeline had to be launched by the end of 2012.  "Today we are attending a very important event, an event that is important not only for Russian energy but for European energy as well," said the Russian President.

Putin's congratulations may be a bit premature.  There are still a number of issues surrounding the proposed pipeline that have yet to be addressed.  The biggest issue, in the middle of the shale gas revolution, is that the pipeline has a capacity that dwarfs any projected European need for Russian gas.  Mikhail Korchemkin, founder and managing director of East European Gas Analysis, noted that once the annual 63 billion cubic meters of South Stream gas is added to Russian current capacity, Gazprom would have the ability to deliver 318 bcm to Europe, twice what the company has promised to Europe by 2020.  "Gazprom has abandoned its guiding principle--sell gas before building expensive infrastructure," he said.   These large infrastructure projects are beginning to pay a toll:  Nordstream is only transporting 30% of its capacity, and Blue Stream is only at 37% of capacity, according to members of the Bulgarian right-wing opposition.

Gazprom currently lacks the supplies to build the pipeline.  According to Jonathan Stern, head of the Natural Gas Research Program at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Gazprom has not yet ordered pipe or organized barges for the pipeline.  He predicts that the offshore section of the pipeline cannot begin until at least 2014.

The gas is being shipped to the European Union, and so the project must meet the demands of the European Commission.  They have not done so, and European Union Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger did not attend the ceremony.  Oettinger had previously referred to the pipeline as a "phantom project."

The Commission has, of course, read in the press that South Stream will pass through the Turkish economic zone in the Black Sea, make landfall in Bulgaria, and then proceed though Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia, Austria and Italy.  The reaction from the EC has been telling.  Guenther Oettinger's press spokeswoman Marlena Holzner said, "For the moment we have not seen a plan for South Stream.  We take note of all the media reports but neither our experts nor Commissioner Oettinger have seen a plan where it says South Stream will start here, it will deliver gas to this entry point and it will go exactly following this route and it will deliver gas from Russia.  We have not seen this."  Holzner expanded her comments:  "To the European Commission, it has never been communicated that there is a final route...There is no environmental impact assessment for the whole route.  As far as we can see it, we don't regard this as a final investment decision."  

By 16 February 2013, Russia needs to submit to the EC copies of the intergovernmental agreements it has negotiated with the transit states, and the EC then has nine months to express its concerns.  In addition, before construction can truely get underway each country involved must submit both environmental impact studies, and social impact studies.  Bulgaria, in particular, must submit an environmental impact study on the pipeline's landfall. Countries who are not party to the agreements but who are adjacent to the route also need to weigh in on a transboundary assessment.   Russia appears to be aware of these issues, as the Russian-European Chamber of Commerce President Sergei Shuklin confirmed the 7 December ribbon cutting was only a signal of Russian seriousness about the project.  "Everything will be concluded (according to EU legislation), especially since Russia just became a member of the World Trade Organization."

As of this writing, South Stream consists of two pieces of pipe welded together on Russian soil, with no permission to extend that pipe into European territory.
 

Nabucco Reduced to Rump Project

With the announcement of the proposed Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) in December 2011, Nabucco has recreated itself as a pipeline proposal that begins at Turkey's western border.  Instead of being the European Union's premier pipeline project in the Southern Energy Corridor, it is now a regional competitor to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Interconnector Turkey Greece Italy (ITGI).

The weakness of the original Nabucco proposal could never be overcome:  there was no source for the natural gas that the pipeline was supposed to carry.  In January Sergey Pravosudov, Director of the Russian Institute of National Resources, said, "Europe has long been discussing supply alternatives.  However, nothing is being done in their main project Nabucco.  Europeans themselves admit that the more time passes the fewer chances remain to breathe life into Nabucco."

Because of this inaction, Turkey decided it could not wait for the European actors to get their act together, and Azerbaijan did not want their market to be limited to Russia.  According to a report in Hurriyet Daily News, a Turkish Foreign Ministry official stated, "With the economic slowdown that will reflect in the use of natural gas, Europe put the breaks on."  A Turkish Energy Ministry official added, "Azerbaijan wanted to sell the gas that it will produce from Shah Deniz 2 gas fields.  It did not want to sell it to Russia and did not have the time to wait for the EU to decide."  Azerbaijani parliamentarian Valeh Alasgarov characterized Europe's approach as indifference.  "No one takes care of this project," he said.  The result was TANAP, an abridged Nabucco to carry 16 bcm of natural gas from the fields.  Turkey would consume 6 bcm themselves, and pass 10 bcm to its Western border for onward movement to Europe.

Mark Adomanis, a contributor to Forbes magazine, declared Nabucco a failure.  As a project to demonstrate European unity against Russian energy policy, the pipeline showed the European Union as "almost comically incompetent and incapable."  Adomanis noted that in 2012 Gazprom was arguably more deeply entrenched in Europe than it ever had been.  Jamestown Foundation's Vladmir Socor noted that while the Nabucco shareholders would never leave the consortium, there were chinks in the armor.  German shareholder RWE was making overtures to TANAP, and the Turkish government (owner of the shareholder Botas) was prioritizing TANAP which was "easier to implement" than Nabucco. Hungary's MOL went on record that as long as there was no definite source of natural gas supply, no final investment decision could be reached on the project.   Julian Lee, an analyst at the Center for Global Energy Studies, declared the project dead.  "I think that Nabucco in the way that it was originally envisaged as a pipeline running from Turkey's eastern border all the way to Europe...is probably over.  I don't think that is going to happen.

In April, Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban met with Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller.  Less than a week later, he announced that MOL would leave Nabucco in favor of South Stream.  In an email, they held out hope that they could rejoin a Nabucco in a different format.  MOL cited "uncertain costs and gas sources and, with the current structure and project management, the implementation of the Nabucco project is not secured.  We believe in the South Corridor concept, that could eventually also include a re-considered Nabucco."  

Austrian shareholder OMV began to consider a Bulgaria to Austria version of Nabucco.  It would use the intergovernmental agreements and regulations that had been negotiated for the original Nabucco, and would cost considerably less since the distance would be shorter.  The consortium submitted the modified proposal for a 1,300 km pipeline to the Shah Deniz consortium.  Nabucco's Managing Director Reinhard Mitschek put the best face he could on it:  "We are convinced that we have submitted a competitive and comprehensive proposal...and that this proposal represents a win-win situation for our shareholders and for suppliers alike."  In changing its size, Nabucco West may have lost the support of the EU.  European Commission spokeswoman Marlene Holzner told the press it did not matter whether Nabucco or a rival won, as long as the EU got direct access to the Caspian gas, and that the initial 10 bcm capacity could be increased in the future.

Nabucco's construction costs for a 10 bcm pipeline are now approaching the per kilometer price of the 63 bcm South Stream pipeline, according to Investcafe's Grigory Birt.  Given the convergence in price, he predicted the new Nabucco had little chance for success.  "The lower the capacity of the project, the less profitable that project will be," he said.

While the final decision rests with the Shah Deniz consortium, the question remains if the European Commission will bring enough political pressure to bear to keep Nabucco-West in the game.  The original Nabucco was designed to carry only 5% of the projected natural gas needs of Europe, and Nabucco-West has less than one-third of the original capacity.  The new proposal does little to meet Europe's desire for a modicum of energy independence from Russia.