Creating Civil Wars is Russian Foreign Policy

Featured in Stars and Stripes on March 24, 2016. To access the original article, click here.

Russia is increasing its presence in Syria, while its efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the impasse grind to a halt. T-90 main battle tanks with explosive armor, only previously deployed in Chechnya and Ukraine, have been spotted outside of Aleppo. Reuters reports seven T-90s are at the Russian airfield in Latakia. Russia took over the main international airport in Damascus last year, and began airlifting tons of supplies, soldiers and armaments into the country, according to Business Insider. President Vladimir Putin confirmed in December that Russia is providing support to the Free Syrian Army.

“We support it from the air, as well as the Syrian army, we assist them with weapons, ammunition and provide material support,” he said.

This is part of a long pattern of Russian expansion of its military reach since the fall of the Soviet Union.

In March 1992, elements of the Russian 14th Army sided with separatists to oppose the central government of Moldova’s efforts to exert sovereignty on the ethnically Russian enclave of Transnistria. Russian officers trained the Transnistrian defense forces, and transferred weaponry to them. The separatist regime engaged in ethnic cleansing, leading to 25,000 Moldovans becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs). Russia then engineered a cease-fire patrolled by predominantly Russian peacekeepers, and the 14th Army remains on Transnistrian soil.

From 1991 to 1993, when Azerbaijan faced a war of occupation by neighboring Armenia, Russia put its entire weight behind pro-Russian Armenia against pro-Western Azerbaijan. This support allowed Armenia to occupy the Nagorno-Karabakh region as well as seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan. During the war, in February 1992, Russia’s 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment surrounded the Azerbaijani town of Khojaly, while Armenians massacred the residents. Moscow said the Russians who had been involved in this action were “volunteers.”

By 1993, the Russian 7th Army was already protecting Armenia’s borders. Russia then arranged to be a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, which has mediated Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks for decades without any results. Azerbaijan houses approximately 600,000-1,000,000 IDPs expelled from its occupied regions. For Russia, however, the continuing unrest provides an excuse for maintaining 3,000 troops at the 102nd Military Base, north of Yerevan, Armenia.

Russian forces supported Abkhazian separatists in their fight with the Georgian government in 1992. Human Rights Watch reported, “The conflict in Abkhazia was heightened by the involvement of Russia, mostly on the Abkhaz side, especially during the war’s initial stages. … Russian arms found their way into Abkhaz hands, Russian planes bombed civilian targets in Georgian-controlled territory, Russian military vessels, manned by supporters of the Abkhaz side, were made available to shell Georgian-held Sukhumi, and at least a handful of Russian-trained and Russian-paid fighters defended Abkhaz territory in Tkvarcheli.”

Human Rights Watch later interviewed a group of six armed Russians in Abkhazia who admitted they had been brought to the conflict area on Russian helicopters, were all former KGB and Spetznaz forces, had been fighting Georgian troops, had previously been fighting in Transnistria, and had begun in Moscow as a group of 30 “experienced, disciplined, Russian professionals.” They then denied being members of Russian government forces, but said they were “independent, patriotic forces.” (It was one of the earliest examples of the “little green men” made famous in the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea.) The result: a cease-fire patrolled by Russian peacekeepers.

This led to devastating results in 2008, when the Russian army intervened in Abkhazia and Ossetia to “restore the peace.” Georgia cares for approximately 300,000 IDPs. Russia is one of three parties involved in the Geneva peace talks. Today, Russian troops remain in these separatist areas, on soil recognized by the international community as Georgian, without the permission of the Georgian government. Russia also recognizes these areas as independent states.

In 2014, Russian forces stationed at the Russian naval station in Crimea surged out of their base in uniforms without insignia, to forcibly evict Ukrainian forces from their own territory. Russian “volunteers” have fought on the side of separatists in eastern Ukraine, and these separatists are armed with Russian tanks, anti-aircraft missiles and personnel carriers. Crater analysis shows that mortar rounds and missiles fired in support of the separatists have their origins inside Russia itself.

Russia has now annexed Crimea, and called for diplomacy to solve the crisis it created in eastern Ukraine. It is a cosponsor of the Minsk talks. Today, Russian troops are stationed in Crimea, and Putin has threatened to introduce Russian troops overtly into eastern Ukraine to “protect” the citizenry.

The pattern is clear: Russian military support for a side in a civil war contributes to unrest, and then Russian diplomatic efforts keep the conflict simmering. The continuing problems justify maintaining a Russian troop presence.

In all these instances, Russian military interventions and/or peace efforts have led to a continued expansion of Russian power and influence. America and its allies in Syria need to learn from history, and not just repeat it.

James J. Coyle, director of Chapman University’s Center for Global Education, is former director of Middle East studies at the U.S. Army War College.

Will Azerbaijan Control Natural Gas to Armenia?

Rumors continue to swirl around the possibilitity that Azerbaijan will purchase the Georgian pipeline that provides Armenia with Russian natural gas. This blog has previously reported on Georgian efforts to privatize the pipeline, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR)'s interest in buying the pipeline, and Georgia's efforts to maintain peace with its neighbors by stating it would only sell 10% of the pipeline--thereby depriving a buyer of the ability to choke off Armenian fuel supplies.

With Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze (left) visiting Baku, speculation about the proposed sale have again arisen. SOCAR President Rovnag Abdullayev stated on January 14 that his company remained interested in using the pipeline to export Azerbaijani gas to the shores of the Black Sea. http://news.am/eng/news/44602.html SOCAR spokesman Nizammedin Guliyev confirmed that talks with Georgia on the subject were continuing, but there was no timeline to the talks. Guliyev's remarks were confirmed by Georgian energy minister Aleko Khetaguri http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-15/azerbaijan-and-georgia-in-talks-over-privatization-of-pipeline.html.

Despite the reports, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Nino Kalandadze sought to distance the Foreign Minister from the subject. In an official briefing on 17 January, he stated that Vashadze would not be discussing the proposed takeover during his visit. "At the moment the issue is not on the agenda," said Kalandadze. "It is not discussed at a state level." http://news.am/eng/news/44777.html

The contradiction may be less than it appears. The Georgian parliament has already done its job by declaring that the pipeline was not a strategic asset. This opens the possibility of a sale of the pipeline. If there were any discussions taking place, they would would be with SOCAR, not with the government of Azerbaijan. So the deputy foreign minister's hedged denial may be on the mark: while discussions are not taking place at the state level, it would appear the discussions with SOCAR that the Georgian energy minister confirmed are ongoing.

Dr. James J. Coyle is available to speak to your organization or at your event. Please contact him at jimcoyle@verizon.net.

AGRI Jeopardizes Nabucco

Seeking to maintain its economic independence from Russia, while giving Europe an independent source of natural gas, the government of Azerbaijan has agreed to a feasibility study to send liquified natural gas (LNG) to Europe via ship. The new agreement establishes the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector (AGRI.)

The signing of the Baku agreement on September 14, 2010 does not promise the launch of this new LNG route, however. Despite voluminous press coverage marking the agreement, the three leaders (Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, and Traian Basecu of Romania) have only agreed to the creation of a joint working group and a series of feasibility studies. Should the project be approved, the equity share for each country will be 33 percent (www.today.az/news/business/73413.html)

The project, as envisioned, will ship 7 to 20 billion cubic meters of gas annually to Romania. Once in Central Europe, Romania can then use its existing pipeline structure to either use the gas itself or sending it on to the rest of Europe. What is unique about AGRI is that the proposal does not rely on pipelines through Russia or Turkey: rather, the gas will be piped to Kulevi in Georgia, where it will be converted to LNG at the oil export terminal there (owned by the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, or SOCAR). It will then be shipped across the Black sea by boat, and offloaded at a planned re-gasification plant in Constanta, Romania. The preliminary cost estimates for the project range from 1.2 to 4.5 billion Euros. (Oil and Gas Eurasia No. 9, September 2010, Baku Summit Launches Breakthrough LNG Project) Romanian President Basescu believes that with these costs, AGRI is more cost effective than the Nabucco project (Eurasia Daily Monitor 7167, September 17, 2010, Black Sea LNG Project: A Spoke in Nabucco's Wheels?) to which Romania is already committed. Azerbaijani President Aliyev predicts the project will take approximately 20 months to complete (www.today.az/news/business/73558.html)

Others have also expressed interest in cooperating, such as Hungary and Ukraine. Yuriy Boyko, the Ukrainian Fuel and Energy Minister, said their country would be interested in building an LNG terminal near Odessa for the importation of 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year. The cost of the Odessa terminal would be $3 billion, but Boyko believes that AGRI could save Kiev at least $60 per thousand cubic meters over the cost of imported Russian gas (ibid).

The new project is in direct competition with Nabucco for Azerbaijani gas. As Vladir Socor points out, Nabucco "The AGRI project, if pursued seriously, can undermine Nabucco by reducing the volumes of Azserbaijani gas available to that pipeline project. Azerbaijan's existing output level (reported at 23.5 bcm in 2009, anticipated at 28 bcm in 2010), its internal consumption (10 to 11 bcm per year in 2009-2010), and its export commitments (some 8 bcm to Turkey and Georgia combined), do not seem to leave sufficient gas volumes to support both Nabucco's first state (at 8 to 10 bcm per year) and the LNG project at the same time." (Eurasia Daily Monitor 7/165, September 15, 2010, Black Sea LNG Project Draws on Gas from Azerbaijan).

Despite problems for Nabucco, AGRI appears to meet the needs of everyone involved. For Azerbaijan's part, the construction of AGRI represents further diversification of delivery systems to ensure the country can continue to service its markets. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said diversifying transportation routes was a key priority in Azerbaijan's energy policy, and he noted that there were already seven pipelines in Azerbaijan which transport the country's oil and gas in different directions. Georgian President Saakasvili stressed the importance of EU countries such as Hungary joining the project. Romanian President Basecu is pleased with the planned investments in infrastructure in his country (www.today.az/news/politics/73465.html ).

Europe also benefits by the new pipeline, in that it meets previously stated goals to diversity their gas suppliers away from Gazprom; at the same time, it also diversifies its source of natural gas away from Turkey. As the AK Party solidifies its hold on that country through constitutional changes, secular Europe might now have a way to access Central Asian gas without depending on pipeline routes through a potentially hostile country.

Dr. James J. Coyle is available to speak to your organization or at your event. Please contact him at jimcoyle@verizon.net.

Will Gas End a War?

The Georgian main North-South gas pipeline--which is Armenia's primary source for natural gas--is on the bidding block. In 2006 Gazprom offered $250 million for the system. According to Vugar Bayramov, President of the Azerbaijani Center for Economic and Social Development, Georgia wanted a billion dollars and rejected the bid (Azerireport.com, August 23, 2010.)

Now a new bidder has surfaced. Bayramov said that the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) is preparing to offer $500 million for the pipeline. Such a move would give the Azerbaijani government control over the Armenian economy, and enable it to pressure Armenia to surrender its hold over Nagorno-Karabakh.

According to Armenian Energy and Natural Resource Minister Armen Movsisian, however, Georgia won't sell the pipeline at any price; and, even if it does, it would not threaten Armenia's energy security (Oil and Gas Eurasia, July-August 2010).

Movsisian may have a point. As reported by this blog on July 8, 2010, Georgian Prime Minister Nika Gilauri promised that if Georgia sold shares of the pipeline, that the government would keep controlling interest. Since the Azerbaijani $500 million is approximately half of Georgia's asking price, Georgia might only be willing to sell 50% minus one share to Azerbaijan.

On the other hand, Georgia might have reason to surrender control of the pipeline to Azerbaijan. It might reason that giving Azerbaijan the means to force a Russian ally to surrounder territory it is occupying as revenge for Russian occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and Ossetia, could be a strategic stroke to weaken the Kremlin's position in the Caucasus.

Dr. James J. Coyle is available to speak to your organization or at your event. Please contact him at jimcoyle@verizon.net.

Georgian Pipeline to Azerbaijan?

Gazprom might not be the winner in the competition to acquire the main North-South pipeline in Georgia, afterall. This blog reported last week that the Georgian government was putting the pipeline up for sale, and speculated that the cash rich Russian pipeline company might purchase the asset. According to the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, "observers in Tblisi say the new owner of the pipeline is 99 percent likely to be SOCAR." The deal apparently has been under discussion at the presidential level between Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev and Georgia's Mikheil Saakashvili for at least a month, according to Oil and Gas Eurasia (09 August 2010).

Such a development could change the politics of the Nagorno-Karabagh dispute. The Georgian North-South pipeline is the major source of Russian natural gas for Armenia, lying to the South of Georgia. Azerbaijan would have the ability to use access to the natural gas to bring pressure on Armenia to achieve a solution to this two decade-old conflict.

Dr. James J. Coyle is available to speak to your organization or at your event. Please contact him at jimcoyle@verizon.net.

Georgia Selling Gas Pipeline that feeds Armenia

Gazprom may soon own Armenia's main supply corridor for natural gas, increasing Russia's ability to control Armenian decisionmaking. According to the website Civil.GE, on July 6 the Georgian parliament endorsed a draft law to privatize state assets, including the North-South Pipeline. This pipeline delivers Russian natural gas to Armenia.

Georgian Prime Minister Nika Gilauri promised that if Georgia sold shares of the pipeline, that the government would keep controlling interest. The opposition tried to hold the prime minister to his word by offering an amendment that would limit the sale of pipeline shares to 49 percent. Had the amendment passed, it would have been impossible for the government to sell control of the pipeline to any outside investors. Parliament rejected the amendment, leaving open the possibility that either GAZPROM or a GAZPROM affiliate could snap up the pipeline.

Parliamentarians who backed the sale insisted that the pipeline would not be sold to Russia, but GAZPROM is not officially a part of the Russian government. GAZPROM has used its control of pipelines to increase the price of natural gas to downstream countries, and has also manipulated the gas supply when these countries take actions of which the Russian government disapproves.

Dr. James J. Coyle is available to speak to your organization or at your event. Please contact him at jimcoyle@verizon.net.

Clinton Trying to Resecure American Ties

Hillary Clinton and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev

Secretary of State Clinton has just returned from a five day, five country whirlwind tour of countries that Russian Prime Minister Demitri Medvedyev refers to as the Russian "zone of privileged interests." Specifically, Clinton called on NATO ally Poland and four countries of the former Soviet Union: Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. All are countries that counted themselves as friends of the United States two years ago, but have either become neutral or rejoined Moscow's orbit. If the United States is interested in access to Caspian oil, the Clinton visit is long overdue.

Against withering criticism from Moscow, Poland gave former President George W. Bush permission to build part of a missile shield there. The United States said the missiles were to defend against the Iranian threat; the Russians pointed out that Iran was nowhere near Poland. President Barack Obama sacrificed the missile shield as part of his efforts to reset relations with the Kremlin. Poland found itself questioning its importance to the United States and to NATO.

Georgia and Ukraine had been considering joining the NATO alliance, but Germany dragged its heals on their applications. Since then, Georgian territories of Abkhazia and Ossetia have broken with the central government in Yerevan, and their separation is enforced by Russian troops. The United States did not respond to this use of Russian force, and America's ally in Ukraine, former president Viktor Yushenko, was turned out at the next election. The new president, long-time Moscow ally Viktor Yanukovich, has presided over a parliament that has extended the Russian lease on their Crimean naval base and -- hours before the arrival of Secretary of State Clinton with a reminder that NATO membership is still on the table -- passed a resolution declaring Ukraine a non-aligned country.

Armenia is unhappy because the United States has not forced the Turks to open its border and for refusing to accept the Armenian occupation of Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan, by contrast, is unhappy because the United States encouraged Turkey to open its border with Armenia before the staus of Nagorno Karabakh was settled. Azerbaijan has signalled its unhappiness by signing new energy agreements with Moscow and with Tehran -- not with the West.

If one looks at where the region's energy resources originate, Azerbaijan, and how they get to the West, via Georgia and Turkey with the Ukraine as an alternative, it is interesting that the US has alienated large portions of the populations and governments of all these countries. Clinton's visit may be just in time; or it could be too little, too late.

Dr. James J. Coyle is available to speak to your organization or at your event. Please contact him at jimcoyle@verizon.net.