Featured in Stars and Stripes on March
24, 2016. To access the original article, click here.
Russia is increasing its presence in
Syria, while its efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the impasse grind to
a halt. T-90 main battle tanks with explosive armor, only previously deployed
in Chechnya and Ukraine, have been spotted outside of Aleppo. Reuters reports
seven T-90s are at the Russian airfield in Latakia. Russia took over the main
international airport in Damascus last year, and began airlifting tons of
supplies, soldiers and armaments into the country, according to Business
Insider. President Vladimir Putin confirmed in December that Russia is
providing support to the Free Syrian Army.
“We support it from the air, as well
as the Syrian army, we assist them with weapons, ammunition and provide
material support,” he said.
This is part of a long pattern of
Russian expansion of its military reach since the fall of the Soviet Union.
In March 1992, elements of the
Russian 14th Army sided with separatists to oppose the central government of
Moldova’s efforts to exert sovereignty on the ethnically Russian enclave of
Transnistria. Russian officers trained the Transnistrian defense forces, and
transferred weaponry to them. The separatist regime engaged in ethnic
cleansing, leading to 25,000 Moldovans becoming internally displaced persons
(IDPs). Russia then engineered a cease-fire patrolled by predominantly Russian
peacekeepers, and the 14th Army remains on Transnistrian soil.
From 1991 to 1993, when Azerbaijan
faced a war of occupation by neighboring Armenia, Russia put its entire weight
behind pro-Russian Armenia against pro-Western Azerbaijan. This support allowed
Armenia to occupy the Nagorno-Karabakh region as well as seven surrounding
regions of Azerbaijan. During the war, in February 1992, Russia’s 366th
Motorized Rifle Regiment surrounded the Azerbaijani town of Khojaly, while
Armenians massacred the residents. Moscow said the Russians who had been
involved in this action were “volunteers.”
By 1993, the Russian 7th Army was
already protecting Armenia’s borders. Russia then arranged to be a co-chair of
the OSCE Minsk Group, which has mediated Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks for
decades without any results. Azerbaijan houses approximately 600,000-1,000,000
IDPs expelled from its occupied regions. For Russia, however, the continuing
unrest provides an excuse for maintaining 3,000 troops at the 102nd Military
Base, north of Yerevan, Armenia.
Russian forces supported Abkhazian
separatists in their fight with the Georgian government in 1992. Human Rights
Watch reported, “The conflict in Abkhazia was heightened by the involvement of
Russia, mostly on the Abkhaz side, especially during the war’s initial stages.
… Russian arms found their way into Abkhaz hands, Russian planes bombed
civilian targets in Georgian-controlled territory, Russian military vessels,
manned by supporters of the Abkhaz side, were made available to shell
Georgian-held Sukhumi, and at least a handful of Russian-trained and
Russian-paid fighters defended Abkhaz territory in Tkvarcheli.”
Human Rights Watch later interviewed
a group of six armed Russians in Abkhazia who admitted they had been brought to
the conflict area on Russian helicopters, were all former KGB and Spetznaz
forces, had been fighting Georgian troops, had previously been fighting in
Transnistria, and had begun in Moscow as a group of 30 “experienced,
disciplined, Russian professionals.” They then denied being members of Russian
government forces, but said they were “independent, patriotic forces.” (It was
one of the earliest examples of the “little green men” made famous in the 2014
Russian seizure of Crimea.) The result: a cease-fire patrolled by Russian
peacekeepers.
This led to devastating results in
2008, when the Russian army intervened in Abkhazia and Ossetia to “restore the
peace.” Georgia cares for approximately 300,000 IDPs. Russia is one of three
parties involved in the Geneva peace talks. Today, Russian troops remain in
these separatist areas, on soil recognized by the international community as
Georgian, without the permission of the Georgian government. Russia also
recognizes these areas as independent states.
In 2014, Russian forces stationed at
the Russian naval station in Crimea surged out of their base in uniforms
without insignia, to forcibly evict Ukrainian forces from their own territory.
Russian “volunteers” have fought on the side of separatists in eastern Ukraine,
and these separatists are armed with Russian tanks, anti-aircraft missiles and
personnel carriers. Crater analysis shows that mortar rounds and missiles fired
in support of the separatists have their origins inside Russia itself.
Russia has now annexed Crimea, and
called for diplomacy to solve the crisis it created in eastern Ukraine. It is a
cosponsor of the Minsk talks. Today, Russian troops are stationed in Crimea,
and Putin has threatened to introduce Russian troops overtly into eastern
Ukraine to “protect” the citizenry.
The pattern is clear: Russian
military support for a side in a civil war contributes to unrest, and then
Russian diplomatic efforts keep the conflict simmering. The continuing problems
justify maintaining a Russian troop presence.
In all these instances, Russian military
interventions and/or peace efforts have led to a continued expansion of Russian
power and influence. America and its allies in Syria need to learn from
history, and not just repeat it.
James
J. Coyle, director of Chapman University’s Center for Global Education, is
former director of Middle East studies at the U.S. Army War College.
