Creating Civil Wars is Russian Foreign Policy

Featured in Stars and Stripes on March 24, 2016. To access the original article, click here.

Russia is increasing its presence in Syria, while its efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the impasse grind to a halt. T-90 main battle tanks with explosive armor, only previously deployed in Chechnya and Ukraine, have been spotted outside of Aleppo. Reuters reports seven T-90s are at the Russian airfield in Latakia. Russia took over the main international airport in Damascus last year, and began airlifting tons of supplies, soldiers and armaments into the country, according to Business Insider. President Vladimir Putin confirmed in December that Russia is providing support to the Free Syrian Army.

“We support it from the air, as well as the Syrian army, we assist them with weapons, ammunition and provide material support,” he said.

This is part of a long pattern of Russian expansion of its military reach since the fall of the Soviet Union.

In March 1992, elements of the Russian 14th Army sided with separatists to oppose the central government of Moldova’s efforts to exert sovereignty on the ethnically Russian enclave of Transnistria. Russian officers trained the Transnistrian defense forces, and transferred weaponry to them. The separatist regime engaged in ethnic cleansing, leading to 25,000 Moldovans becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs). Russia then engineered a cease-fire patrolled by predominantly Russian peacekeepers, and the 14th Army remains on Transnistrian soil.

From 1991 to 1993, when Azerbaijan faced a war of occupation by neighboring Armenia, Russia put its entire weight behind pro-Russian Armenia against pro-Western Azerbaijan. This support allowed Armenia to occupy the Nagorno-Karabakh region as well as seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan. During the war, in February 1992, Russia’s 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment surrounded the Azerbaijani town of Khojaly, while Armenians massacred the residents. Moscow said the Russians who had been involved in this action were “volunteers.”

By 1993, the Russian 7th Army was already protecting Armenia’s borders. Russia then arranged to be a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, which has mediated Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks for decades without any results. Azerbaijan houses approximately 600,000-1,000,000 IDPs expelled from its occupied regions. For Russia, however, the continuing unrest provides an excuse for maintaining 3,000 troops at the 102nd Military Base, north of Yerevan, Armenia.

Russian forces supported Abkhazian separatists in their fight with the Georgian government in 1992. Human Rights Watch reported, “The conflict in Abkhazia was heightened by the involvement of Russia, mostly on the Abkhaz side, especially during the war’s initial stages. … Russian arms found their way into Abkhaz hands, Russian planes bombed civilian targets in Georgian-controlled territory, Russian military vessels, manned by supporters of the Abkhaz side, were made available to shell Georgian-held Sukhumi, and at least a handful of Russian-trained and Russian-paid fighters defended Abkhaz territory in Tkvarcheli.”

Human Rights Watch later interviewed a group of six armed Russians in Abkhazia who admitted they had been brought to the conflict area on Russian helicopters, were all former KGB and Spetznaz forces, had been fighting Georgian troops, had previously been fighting in Transnistria, and had begun in Moscow as a group of 30 “experienced, disciplined, Russian professionals.” They then denied being members of Russian government forces, but said they were “independent, patriotic forces.” (It was one of the earliest examples of the “little green men” made famous in the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea.) The result: a cease-fire patrolled by Russian peacekeepers.

This led to devastating results in 2008, when the Russian army intervened in Abkhazia and Ossetia to “restore the peace.” Georgia cares for approximately 300,000 IDPs. Russia is one of three parties involved in the Geneva peace talks. Today, Russian troops remain in these separatist areas, on soil recognized by the international community as Georgian, without the permission of the Georgian government. Russia also recognizes these areas as independent states.

In 2014, Russian forces stationed at the Russian naval station in Crimea surged out of their base in uniforms without insignia, to forcibly evict Ukrainian forces from their own territory. Russian “volunteers” have fought on the side of separatists in eastern Ukraine, and these separatists are armed with Russian tanks, anti-aircraft missiles and personnel carriers. Crater analysis shows that mortar rounds and missiles fired in support of the separatists have their origins inside Russia itself.

Russia has now annexed Crimea, and called for diplomacy to solve the crisis it created in eastern Ukraine. It is a cosponsor of the Minsk talks. Today, Russian troops are stationed in Crimea, and Putin has threatened to introduce Russian troops overtly into eastern Ukraine to “protect” the citizenry.

The pattern is clear: Russian military support for a side in a civil war contributes to unrest, and then Russian diplomatic efforts keep the conflict simmering. The continuing problems justify maintaining a Russian troop presence.

In all these instances, Russian military interventions and/or peace efforts have led to a continued expansion of Russian power and influence. America and its allies in Syria need to learn from history, and not just repeat it.

James J. Coyle, director of Chapman University’s Center for Global Education, is former director of Middle East studies at the U.S. Army War College.

Russia Looking for an Exit?

Published by the Atlantic Council on September 24, 2015. To access the original article, click here.

As Russia increases its support for beleaguered Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, rebels in eastern Ukraine have observed a ceasefire since September 1. The second Minsk ceasefire agreement, signed in February, had been repeatedly violated. But things have changed. Some separatist leaders have left the area, returning to posh jobs in Moscow. Former Donetsk Prime Minister Alexander Borodai has resumed his consulting career in the Russian capital, and former Luhansk Prime Minister Marat Bashirov chairs the government relations committee at the Russian Managers Association.

Russian reporting on Ukraine has also decreased. Two of its star war reporters have been sent to Syria. On September 6, Dmitry Kiselyov's two-and-half hour program—Rossiya 1's flagship weekly news program—was different: known for his fiery rhetoric against the government in Kyiv, the host "was uncharacteristically cursory" in his comments about Ukraine, the BBC observed. Kiselyov didn't discuss Ukraine until more than half way through his show, and this was in a week with deadly clashes outside Ukraine's parliament. Another Russian journalist observed, "Kiselyov knows something about a change in the rules of the game...The rest of us will find out a little later." RT reported that an impetus for better relations is coming from the West.

Talking heads began to speculate that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be looking to ease the Ukraine crisis and restore relations with the West. Carnegie Endowment's Dmitri Trenin writes, "Moscow certainly hopes that cooperation with the United States and the West on Syria would blunt their confrontation over Ukraine." He goes on to say that it's "probably not a mere coincidence" that hostilities in the Donbas have died down when they did. Another possible reason for the timing is Putin's upcoming speech at the United Nations General Assembly on September 28. Reduced hostilities in Ukraine could lead to a blunting of the criticism he can expect from the world community. The strategy is paying off: President Obama has agreed to meet with Putin during his visit.

There are a number of factors for Russia's changing strategy in Ukraine. Despite Putin's bluster about restoring Russian greatness, it is in considerable economic difficulty. The state budget is highly dependent on the sale of oil and gas. Andrey Movchan reports that 60 percent of consolidated budget revenues come from taxes either directly or indirectly related to the oil and gas sector. The Russian government needs oil at $100 a barrel to balance its budget; with oil selling between $40 and $50 per barrel, it is running deep deficits. The Russian economy is projected to decline by three percent in 2015.

The future doesn't look any brighter for Russia's energy sector either. While Rosneft planned to double its oil shipments to China, and Gazprom announced a doubling of the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline, the reality is quite different. Oil shipments to China have fallen below contracted levels (1.48 mt increase for 2015 instead of the contracted 5 million mt increase). Sanctions are preventing western participation in the Sakhalin II project. China is not providing the $25 billion financing to build the Power of Siberia pipeline and has refused to sign a decade-long anticipated contract for the Altai pipeline. In the West, the much ballyhooed Turkish Stream is also being held in abeyance. The Russian mega-energy deals of the last decade appear to be more propaganda than reality.

Economics is not the Russian President's only concern: the Russian people do not support deeper involvement in Ukraine. According to the Levada Center, 70 percent of Russians supported the takeover of Crimea as "Russian" land, and 80 percent say that retaking Crimea proves Russia's great power status. But when it comes to eastern Ukraine, the results are different. As of March 2015, 57 percent of Russians said the country should stay within its present borders, 64 percent said Russia should not try to keep former Soviet republics under control, and 55 percent said the country should focus on domestic issues. As the Russian economy continues to worsen, it's likely these isolationist sentiments will only increase.

Russia's continuing involvement in Ukraine is turning counterproductive for the Kremlin. Before 2014, Ukraine was leaning toward a more Western identity but nothing was solidified. That identity is no longer ambiguous, thanks to the Kremlin's overreach. Now there are US special forces on Ukrainian soil, training Ukrainian troops. The commander of US Army-Europe Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges said that those numbers may be expanded. In 2014, Ukraine signed an Association Agreement with the European Union, eliminating the possibility of it joining the Kremlin-led Eurasia Economic Union. Long divided NATO allies remain united over Russian sanctions, and for the first time in its post-Soviet history, a majority of Ukrainians want their country to join NATO.

Last week US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter spoke with his Russian counterpart on ways deconflict Syria, but any cooperation between the two countries should not soften our Ukraine policy. The West may have only marginal influence on the worldwide energy market, but increasing pressure on pipeline routes, Russian public opinion, and negative geopolitical developments are taking their toll on the Kremlin's resolve.

James J. Coyle is a Research Fellow at the Atlantic Council and the Director of Global Education at Chapman University in Orange, CA.

Russian Disinformation Alienates the West from Russian Periphery

Published by the Atlantic Council on July 20, 2015, and featured in Newsweek as “How Putin Keeps His Neighbors On Edge,”  and in the Orange County Register as "Chapman's James Coyle: How Putin spins events, issues to keep Russia's independent neighbors in line"on September 13, 2015. To access the original article, click here.

The Russian Army has released a photo of a Ukrainian tank decorated with a swastika, yet the original Reuters photograph shows no such emblem. Russia also released a photo of a Ukrainian soldier covered in Nazi tattoos, but that picture was actually taken in 2005, inside a Russian prison. Europe is revolted by any reminders of its Nazi past, which is why Russia plays up false claims that Kyiv is a product of that tradition. At a time when Ukraine and other former Soviet republics need worldwide support, Russia continues its media barrage to alienate these countries from their natural allies in the West.

The stakes are enormous. In 1997, former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski identified Azerbaijan, Iran, South Korea, Turkey, and Ukraine as "critically important geopolitical pivots" in The Grand Chessboard. Without Ukraine, he writes, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Similarly important is Azerbaijan, which Brzezinski calls the cork in the bottle containing the riches of the Caspian Sea Basin and Central Asia.

Russia continues a strategy of keeping its former republics separate and reliant on Moscow. It opposed construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline until a Russian company was included in the consortium. When Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey announced their willingness to build the Nabucco natural gas pipeline, Russia retaliated by promoting the rival South Stream pipeline. As Ukraine pulls further away from the Russian orbit, Moscow supports the creation of Turkish Stream to bypass Ukraine as a transit state. When Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan announced their intention to build a Trans-Caspian pipeline, Moscow raised environmental concerns—while ignoring similar environmental issues surrounding Russian platforms in the northern Caspian.

There are differences in how Moscow uses its information operations in the various countries. According to the Monterey Institute's Ruben Gzirian, "Russia targets political and business elites, whereas it targets ethnic Russians among the general populations of Ukraine, Moldova, and the Baltics." Such targeting furthers the Putin doctrine justifying Russian intervention to protect Russian-speakers, no matter where they are. As an example, in May 2014 Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin played up to sympathizers in Transnistria and Ukraine when he tweeted future plans to visit the area on board a TU-160—Russia's largest strategic bomber.

But Russian disinformation isn't the only thing that alienates the Russian periphery from the West. A recent spate of press reports has detailed Azerbaijan's detention of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Khadija Ismayilova. Reports on Azerbaijan's dire human rights situation often give short shrift to the country's rapid economic transformation. According to the World Bank, about half of all Azeris lived in poverty in the early 2000s; by 2013, that ratio had fallen to 5 percent. This remarkable feat took place while roughly 600,000 people—about 7 percent of the population—remain displaced because of Armenia's occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions.

While Western human rights organizations focus negative attention on Azerbaijan, Russia has been offering an olive branch. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently criticized Russian TV for not sufficiently covering the 2015 European Games in Baku. Putin attended the games himself, and used the occasion to meet with President Ilham Aliyev. The timing was no coincidence.

Ukraine and Azerbaijan have a lot in common with Moscow: many Russian speakers, a shared past in the former Soviet Union, and transportation and communication links through the old imperial center. What keeps these countries out of the Russian orbit is their desire for sovereignty. Russia or its allies already control large swaths of territory in both those states. Those occupied lands house the Russian Black Sea Naval Fleet, and justify a major Russian Air Force base in Armenia. The United States and the European Union must give the independence of Ukraine and Azerbaijan the highest priority. If Russia manages to convince the West to avoid former Soviet states as illiberal entities, the only winner on the global chessboard will be Putin.

In February, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko told US Secretary of State John Kerry that Russian actions are an affront to Ukrainian sovereignty, and that he appreciates US support of Ukrainian independence. Meanwhile, Aliyev emphasizes the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan, a country former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called a strategic partner of the United States.

Indeed, partnerships are there for the taking. The real questions are whether Kyiv can maintain its country's unity and pro-Western orientation, and if Azerbaijan will partner with the West—or the Kremlin—or try to dance with both.

James J. Coyle is a Research Fellow at the Atlantic Council and the Director of Global Education at Chapman University in Orange, CA.

It’s Hard to Take Russian Propaganda Seriously. But We Must.

Published by the Atlantic Council on June 22, 2015, and featured in Newsweek and Kyiv Post as “The U.S. Should Do More to Counter Putin's Propaganda” on June 23, 2015. To access the original article, click here.

Three Russian television stations interviewed Andrei Petkov from a hospital bed in Nikolayev, Ukraine, in April 2014. Rossia 1 described him, with a bandage on his nose, as an ordinary citizen attacked by neo-Nazis and nationalists; NTV named him a German spy for a secret European organization; and the National Independent News of Crimea identified him as a pediatric surgeon who had saved the lives of more than 200 infants before getting caught in the crossfire. Similarly, Russian television has interviewed the same blonde woman as a native of five different cities in Ukraine. She has been a housewife, the mother of a soldier, and an exile living in Russia. In 2014, Russian state television showed a video depicting the murder of a pro-Russian fighter in eastern Ukraine by nationalists. But the video was a fabrication; it was made in the north Caucasus in 2012. The lies on Russian TV have become so numerous and egregious that one news outlet compiled a list of Russia's top 100 lies about Ukraine.

Russian propaganda, sometimes comically inept by Western standards, wants to convince the Russian public, Russian-speaking populations in Crimea and the Donbas, and elites in Western Europe that it's right about Ukraine. They are the targets of Russian President Vladimir Putin's "weaponization of propaganda," according to Russian author Peter Pomerantsev and his colleague Michael Weiss.

Its primary international outlet is RT (formerly Russia Today), a Kremlin-financed cable news network resembling CNN or Fox News. Reaching 644 million viewers in Arabic, English, and Spanish, its message is remarkably consistent, and predictably boring: Putin is a strong leader who is protecting ethnic Russians from sinister Western forces. "We're something along the lines of Russia's Information Defense Ministry," RT employees told Spiegel Online.

In addition to RT, the news agency has created seven YouTube channels aimed at specific countries and linguistic areas: RT America, RT UK, RT France, RT Spanish, RT Russian, RT German, and RT Arabic. Researchers at the George Washington University reviewed RT videos posted for a month in 2015, and found that 27 percent of videos on RT's main channel highlighted Russia's views on Ukraine. On RT Deutsch, 43 percent of its videos centered on Ukraine. RT Russia posted 34 percent of its videos on Ukraine, and these videos received 52 percent of views.

RT also owns the Ruptly video news agency in Berlin. According to Ruptly newscaster Ivan Rodionov, the agency has 14 subscribers and over 200 customers, including public and private German broadcasters. The agency offers almost exclusively videos that are favorable toward pro-Russian supporters of the People's Republic of Donetsk.

The propaganda can be heavy-handed. Russians are told that Ukrainian nationalists shot down the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 and the Kyiv government is composed of neo-Nazis. Putin has repeatedly denied that Russian soldiers are fighting in Ukraine, despite a growing number of reports of secret funerals and prisoners of war turning up in Kyiv hospitals.

Even if Russian television can be crude and propagandistic, it shapes opinion in Russia. Ninety-four percent of Russians get their news on Ukraine from domestic television networks. Only three percent of Russians believe Donbas separatists shot down Flight MH 17.

And Russian-speakers who live outside the country rely on Russian television. In Estonia, where there is a large Russian-speaking minority, 72 percent of non-Estonians prefer Russian television, and this is reflected in their views. About two weeks after Flight MH 17 crashed, 38 percent of non-Estonians living in Estonia told pollsters that the Ukrainian government was responsible.

One can understand Putin's desire to maintain domestic support in Russia and to build support for his efforts in the killing fields of Ukraine. His goal in Europe is more elusive, but of higher strategic importance. "Putin's ultimate objective is to fracture NATO," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey said. His words are echoed by United States Vice President Joseph Biden, who said Putin was seeking "to create cracks in the European body politic which he can then exploit."

To halt Putin's ideological offensive, European policymakers have begun to beef up their public diplomacy efforts. Denmark is offering broadcast rights to popular television crime dramas that can be dubbed into Russian, Germany is providing Russian-language news and documentaries, and US diplomats are reaching out to Hollywood. Estonia will launch a new Russian-language channel with 20 hours of original programming a week in September. In the United States, however, supporters of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty are fending off funding cuts. As the Cold War experience demonstrated, news programs from this venerable outlet reach decision-makers and other elites. The West should also take advantage of already existing commercial outlets with worldwide distribution such as CNN and Sky News. With cutbacks of their own, these broadcasters could use video feed and experts that expose Russian lies. The truth will set you free, if you actually broadcast the truth.

James J. Coyle is a Research Fellow at the Atlantic Council and the Director of Global Education at Chapman University in Orange, CA.

Russia Has Complete Information Dominance in Ukraine

Published by the Atlantic Council on May 12, 2015, and featured by Newsweek, Kyiv Post, Radio Free Europe, and the George Marshall Institute as “Putin Controls All Ukraine's Airwaves, Phones and Computers” on May 17, 2015. To access the original article, click here.

Hackers have consistently used low-level cyber warfare tactics to advance Russian goals in Ukraine.

A dedicated group of hackers successfully infected the e-mail systems of the Ukrainian military, counterintelligence, border patrol, and local police. The hackers use a spear-phishing attack in which malware is hidden in an attachment that appears to be an official Ukrainian government email. For the most part, the technologies are not advanced but the attacks have been persistent. Lookingglass, a cybersecurity firm, suspects the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is the culprit behind the virus dubbed Operation Armageddon.

The Russian government is likely behind an even more dangerous virus. Since 2010 BAE Systems has been monitoring the activities of malware they dubbed Snake, and numerous digital footprints point to the Russian Bear. Moscow time zone stamps were left in the code and Russian names are written into the software. Other clues point to the Kremlin. "It's unlikely to be hacktivists who made this. The level of sophistication is too high. It is very well written—and extremely stealthy," observed Dave Garfield, BAE's Managing Director for cyber security.

According to the IT security company Symantec, Snake has infected dozens of computers in the office of Ukraine's Prime Minister and at least ten Ukrainian embassies since 2012. Snake was used against the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to access documents on the Ukraine crisis. The malware establishes a "digital beachhead" that allows its operators to deliver malicious code to the targeted networks. The implications are far-reaching: "Russia not only now has complete informational dominance in Ukraine," an intelligence analyst told the Financial Times, "it also has effective control of the country's digital systems, too. It has set the stage."

Another hacker group in Russia exploited a security flaw in Microsoft Windows software to spy on NATO, Ukraine, and several other targets. Dubbed Sandworm Team after researchers discovered references in the code to the Dune series of science-fiction novels, the group used a "zero day" attack—a flaw in the software that has not been previously identified and for which there is no preexisting fix—which is usually associated with deep pockets. In Ukraine, the malware was targeted at regional governments, another clue that the hackers were not criminals.

So far, Russian cyberattacks have been relatively low key. There's an obvious reason why: the Kremlin already has access to Ukrainian telecommunications. Russia built the system. Even the system Ukraine uses to monitor the activities of its own citizens, System for Operative Investigative Activities or SORM, was originally developed by the Russian KGB. When Russia invaded Crimea it gained access to the national telephone company's operations center on the peninsula. If the Russian government wanted to shut down Ukraine's power and telecommunications, it could do so easily. "And there's nothing that Ukraine could do to stop it," said Jeffrey Carr, CEO of the cybersecurity firm TAIA Global.

Cyber activity was used kinetically as Russia seized Crimea. Ukrainian law enforcement agencies reported Russian cyberattacks had collapsed the communication systems of almost all Ukrainian forces that could pose a danger to the invading Russian troops. Mobile telephone services were blocked, Russian naval ships jammed radio communications, Crimean government websites were knocked offline, telecommunications offices were raided, and cables cut.

“Russia has cutting-edge electronic warfare equipment and personnel trained in proper EW/SIGINT doctrine (what they called Radio-Electronic Combat) and Ukraine is playing catch-up. A generation's worth of neglect of the Ministry of Defense and the security services by Kyiv…cannot be made good in a few months,” said John Schindler, an expert on information warfare.

US technology is also vulnerable: Russia claims (and the Pentagon denies) that it used its control of the cyber battlefield to intercept a US drone as it patrolled Crimean skies on March 14, 2014.

Cyberattacks have increased in frequency around the time of military action, possibly indicating that the attacks are part of the overall offensive. The number of callbacks—computer communications showing someone is hacking a computer—to Russia increased as the turmoil rose.

Russia controls the airwaves, the phone lines, and the computers. The Ukrainian government needs to rebuild its telecommunications network using non-Russian companies and technology. In the short term, US diplomats and military trainers in Ukraine should avoid using Ukrainian communications. The United States also needs to harden its communications to avoid incidents such as the rumored drone intercept. In the long term, the United States must face the reality that it is engaged in a decades-long contest for the Eurasian heartland and will have to adjust its tactics accordingly. Cyber warfare is merely the latest battlefield in which politics is pursued by other means.

James J. Coyle is a research fellow at the Atlantic Council and the Director of Global Education at Chapman University.

James J. Coyle: Energy is the key to making Moscow pay

Published in the Orange County Register on May 17, 2014. To access the original article, click here.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is engaging in a shadow dance – maskirovka – to prove to the world he is not behind the May 11 separatist referendum in eastern Ukraine.

He has called on his allies in Donetsk and Luhansk to cancel the vote, and he endorsed the May 25 presidential election as a “step in the right direction.” He also claims Russian troops have withdrawn from the border. Pro-Moscow separatists ignored the president’s words and the Pentagon has seen no evidence of a withdrawal.

The referendum will, no doubt, show voters supporting independence. This result will be a lie. The majority of people in the East, as shown from the first vote for independence in 1991 to a Pew Research Poll taken in April, have consistently supported remaining in a unified Ukraine.

The U.S. has threatened additional sanctions if the referendum is held. Canada and Japan have already joined the United States and the European Union in leveraging sanctions against Russia for its actions in Ukraine. These measures, targeting individuals and companies instead of the Russian population as a whole, appear to be a tepid response to recent events.

However, the threat of additional sanctions is having an effect on the international financial community.

The rating company Standard and Poor’s has downgraded Russian sovereign debt from BBB to BBB-, one step above junk status. As a result, Western banks are refusing to refinance Russian debt. Moscow has had to cancel some bond auctions for lack of buyers. The Russian 10-year bond yield stands at 9.7 percent, higher than Eurobond yields from such troubled countries as Greece and Portugal.

Citigroup has reduced its exposure by 9 percent, JP Morgan has reduced its exposure by 13 percent, and Bank of America has reduced its exposure by 22 percent. Capital flight from Russia in the first quarter of 2014 was over $63 billion, approximately the same amount as left the country in all of 2013.

The actions of the financial community by itself may not be enough. In his keynote address to the Baltic American Freedom League’s annual dinner on Saturday, U.S. Congressman Ed Royce, R-Fullerton, noted the way to make Moscow pay for its behavior is through energy policy. Royce noted that 52 percent of the government of Russia’s annual budget comes from hydrocarbon revenues. “If you want to hurt Moscow,” he said, “drive down the price of energy.”

Royce proposed exporting liquefied natural gas, also known as LNG, from the United States to Europe.

This would reduce Europe’s dependency on Russia for its gas and oil, increase the depressed prices in the United States, and decrease the price for gas in Europe. In addition to the congressman’s suggestions, there are a number of other steps the world community could take.

The European Union can stand fast in opposing the construction of the Gazprom-owned and operated South Stream pipeline. This energy conduit is designed to send 63 billion cubic meters per year of natural gas to Europe. The pipeline will not increase the total amount of Russian gas delivered, however, as its sole purpose is to bypass the pipeline through Ukraine. This will allow Russia to squeeze Ukraine whenever Moscow desires, while keeping Europe “hooked” on Russian energy.

At the same time, the EU can support the Southern Energy Corridor, designed to bring non-Russian natural gas to Europe. Kazakhstan could increase its flow of oil to Europe through the underutilized Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

Poland, Hungary and Slovakia can reverse the flow of natural gas in the pipelines transiting those countries, to provide Ukraine with non-Russian gas at prices at least $100 per thousand cubic meters less than what Russia is charging that country.

Middle Eastern energy production should be maximized. This requires a number of political advances. If peace were restored in the Libyan Civil War, harmony brought to the warring factions of Iraq, approvals granted to the Kurdish regional government to export its product, Iranian production brought back into the international mix and the gas deposits of the Eastern Mediterranean exploited, the quantity of oil and gas would increase markedly and Moscow’s revenues would decline precipitously.

James J. Coyle, Ph.D., is the Director of Global Education at Chapman University, and the Executive Director of the Caspian Research Institute, an online think tank.

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Russia's Lame Legal Arguments

Russia's lame legal arguments

falseCoyle, James J

Press the Escape key to close

.Orange County Register [Santa Ana, Calif] 25 Apr 2014.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has put forward justifications for his annexation of the Crimea and continued meddling in Eastern Ukraine.

The broadest of his claims is that Russia has the right to intervene anywhere, anytime, if ethnic Russians are endangered. If accepted by the world community, this modern day Brezhnev doctrine (the Soviet Union has the right to intervene in communist countries to protect them from the threat of capitalism) would give the Russian leader the right to intervene in the internal affairs of any country of the former Soviet empire.
Putin has also put forward a number of legal arguments, the first of which is that the government in Kiev is an illegal formation. Russian leaders have pointed out that the Ukrainian constitution allows for the removal of a president only by death, illness, physical or mental incapacity, or impeachment. When the Ukrainian parliament removed President Viktor Yanukovych from his position after he fled the country, the parliament did so by a majority vote - failing to observe the constitutional niceties.
Consequently, Yanukovych remains president of Ukraine. This has a number of implications. Since the current government in Kiev was created outside of constitutional provisions, it is illegal and Russia has no one with whom to dialogue about events.
Putin has asserted that Crimea has always been a part of Russia and that Premier Nikita Khrushchev's transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was "in clear violation of the constitutional norms that were in place even then." When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Russian people realized they were not simply robbed, but plundered.
Russia also uses the principle of self-determination to justify annexation of Crimea, citing a referendum held in March in which 83 percent of Crimean inhabitants participated. The vote was held under the guns of armed supporters of Moscow. Integration into Russia received 96 percent approval.
Russia has gleefully called on the example of the West, including the United States, that approved the independence of Kosovo from Serbia. If Kosovo can do it, Putin asked, why can't Crimea?
The Russian position is wrong. While it is true the Ukrainian constitution did not include removal of a president by majority vote, the constitution also did not envision its president fleeing the country after looting the treasury. Further, there is no provision within the constitution authorizing parts of the country to declare independence or to unite with neighboring powers.
Putin declared the fall of the Soviet Union the greatest tragedy of the 20th century. It is therefore odd to hear him challenge the 1954 decision of that country's premier. The leader of the Soviet Union had the power to send its citizens to the Gulag, authorize mass deportations of the Tatars and so on, but Putin does not believe he had the power to transfer Crimea.
No one accepts the legitimacy of the 2014 referendum that took place while Crimea was under armed occupation. A more accurate view on the right to self-determination is the 1991 referendum in which 54 percent of Crimeans voted to separate from Moscow.
Kosovo separated from Serbia after war and ethnic cleansing. Kosovo did not seek to join another country. In Crimea, there was no war, no ethnic cleansing and no desire for independence. International law recognizes the right of a government to have the monopoly on the use of force within a country: Kiev's efforts to regain control in the east is its sovereign right.
Moscow's meddling in Ukraine is cynical, power politics and not justified by international law.
 

Crimea following Russian Playbook

James J. Coyle: Crimea following Russian playbook

 

By JAMES J. COYLE / Contributing Writer

Published: March 6, 2014 Updated: 3:19 p.m.

Moscow has a long history of using military force to maintain its control over areas it considers part of its empire. East Berlin, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are examples from Cold War history. Other examples are less well known in the West, but are still significant.
On Dec. 27, 1979, Soviet forces dressed in Afghan army uniforms took over the major government and military installations in Kabul, Afghanistan. Russia recognized Babrak Karmal as the rightful leader of Afghanistan and then heeded his request for intervention (broadcast from his location inside the Soviet Union) to justify the invasion. The Soviets announced their military action was to protect the socialist revolution in Afghanistan.
A decade later, as the Soviet Union collapsed, a section of Moldova separated from that country and unilaterally declared its independence. This separatist region, the Trans-Dniester, was supported by Moscow in a brief war in 1992. Russian troops then moved into the area as peacekeepers. Russia now chairs fruitless peace talks between the two sides. Russia also used its position in Transdniester as justification to cancel its involvement with the Conventional Forces in Europe arms limitation treaty.
In the same period, areas within Georgia broke away from that country. These separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, declared their independence. Russia again moved troops into the area as peacekeepers and co-chaired peace talks that have gone nowhere. In 2008, when Georgia tried to restore its sovereignty over these separatist areas, Moscow fought a war with that country, supposedly to protect Russian citizens living in the breakaway republics. Russia has since recognized the two areas as sovereign nations and kept their forces on the Georgian border.
In 1991-94 Armenia invaded around one-fifth of Azerbaijan's territory, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region. During the war, Armenia was heavily supported by the Russian military. Today, the largest Russian military base outside of Russian territory is located in Armenia.
The United Nations Security Council passed four resolutions acknowledging that Nagorno Karabakh and the surrounding occupied territories are part of Azerbaijan, and demanding immediate withdrawal of all Armenian troops from the occupied territories. But the resolutions remain unfulfilled by Russian-backed Armenia. Given Russia’s veto power on the Security Council, it is not surprising that the Council does nothing to push for the implementation of its own resolutions. As in Moldova and Georgia, Russia is a cosponsor of peace talks that have not solved the conflict.
Now it is Ukraine’s turn. Russian military units dressed in uniforms without insignia (but driving Russian-licensed military vehicles) occupied or surrounded major governmental and military installations in Crimea. Russia has recognized Sergei Aksyonov as the leader of Crimea, despite his party having the support of 3 percent of the people. Russia is defending its moves in the area as an effort to protect Russian citizens in Crimea. As NATO forces mass on the Polish border and the United States calls for a cease-fire, Russian President Vladimir Putin has ended military maneuvers on the Russian-Ukrainian border. He said he has not ruled out direct military intervention in the east of the country, if necessary to protect Russian citizens.
If history is a guide, neither Europe nor the United States will militarily defend Ukraine’s independence. Any United Nations resolution will call for respecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but will not contain enforcement provisions or a condemnation of Russian moves.
A cease-fire will be established, with Russian troops acting as peacekeepers. Russia will co-chair peace talks that will enshrine their continued involvement. Russia, controlling Ukraine’s northern borders and the Crimea, will have a stranglehold on that nation’s independence. American prestige in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus will slip another notch.
American politicians are calling for steps to roll back Russian gains in Crimea. For their calls to be heeded, they should first call for the removal of Russian troops in the conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan.
James J. Coyle, Ph.D., is the director of Global Education at Chapman University and is chair of the Eurasian committee of the Pacific Council on International Policy.

Radicals Take Over Ukraine Protests

James J. Coyle: Radicals take over Ukraine protests

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--> Street demonstrations have resumed in Kiev, capital of Ukraine. Unlike the 2013 demonstrations, which protested President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to turn from the European Union, the new violence is being led by anarchists.

Jan. 19, several hundred rioters on Hrushevsky Street, near the site of previous demonstrations on Independence Square, attacked police lines with sticks and bats. They threw Molotov cocktails that burned police buses. There were pitched battles in which both sides threw rocks. Eighty security troops were injured, and 103 demonstrators were treated for injuries. Police arrested 32, including two reporters working for the U.S.-financed Radio Liberty.
Opposition figures, such as Fatherland party leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk and former boxing champion Vitali Klitschko, who had been ringleaders in the November/December demonstrations, condemned the violence. “Violence leads to nothing but mayhem,” Yatsenyuk said. “With radical actions, we destroy our probable victory.”
What changed the attitude of the opposition leaders? First, the government appeared willing to negotiate. According to opposition parliamentarian Andriy Pavlovsky, the government announced it would not implement a new law forbidding street demonstrations. In a nationally televised address, Yanukovych called for dialogue and compromise.
Second, and more importantly, the demonstrators themselves have changed. The organizers of the violence appear to be members of a right-wing youth group, the Right Sector movement. This group is not part of the larger mass of demonstrators camped on the square, but a radical fringe that occupied the Kiev City Hall building in December. The BBC reports that the backbone of the organization is formed by Russian-speaking soccer fans sharing nationalist views.
While most members of the Right Sector oppose Ukraine joining the Russia-sponsored Customs Union, they also oppose moving closer to the European Union. The Right Sector considers the EU to be an oppressor. Instead, the group wants to use the unrest to “destroy the state skeleton” and allow them to build a new state, supposedly in their own image and likeness.
The “mainstream” demonstrators have grown tired of the stalemate, and the inability of opposition parties to influence government decisions. It does not appear, however, that the protesters have joined the anarchists in their attacks on the police.
As dire as it appears, the attacks by the Right Sector offer an opportunity to resolve the political crisis that has paralyzed the country for three months. For the first time, the centrist opposition and the government are in agreement on something: that the Right Sector movement must be stopped. If the government decides to break the violence through police action, conditions will worsen. If, on the other hand, the government enters negotiations with the opposition parties, a peaceful ending to the unrest is within reach.
James J. Coyle is a professor and the director of Global Education at Chapman University and chair of the Eurasian Committee of the Pacific Council on International Policy.

Putin Wins in the Ukraine

James J. Coyle: Putin wins in Ukraine

By JAMES J. COYLE / For the Register

Published: Dec. 27, 2013 Updated: 2:42 p.m.

GETTY IMAGES

In Kiev, the crowds are fading from the Euromaidan, scene of the largest demonstrations since the Orange Revolution. The onslaught of winter has driven the people to their homes – and the warmth of New Years and Eastern Orthodox Christmas will hold them there for weeks to come.

Ukrainian anger over President Viktor Yanukovych's spurning of the European Union may simmer for some time, but Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have won the country by delivering something no one else could: cheap energy to heat their homes through the winter.

Under Russian pressure, Ukraine abandoned its plans to sign an association agreement with the European Union. Yanukovych promised to fire the officials in his government who negotiated the Free Trade Area Agreement and demanded at least $27 billion dollars from the European Union to resume negotiations – a demand EU enlargement chief Stefan Füle said had “no grounds in reality.” EU talks are now suspended.

Both Russia and Ukraine benefit from canceling the deal. For Russia, Ukraine stays in Moscow's economic and strategic orbit. “Ukraine is our fully-fledged strategic partner beyond any doubt,” said Putin.

Russia did not get everything it wanted, however. Moscow pushed Ukraine to join its own economic pact, the Eurasian Customs Union. So far, Ukraine has resisted. Russia also moved one step closer to taking over the Ukrainian natural gas pipeline network.

Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov announced it was prepared to resume talks on establishing a consortium to manage the system, a proposal that Kiev had previously rejected. Ukraine's president said the “road is open” to making Gazprom, the Russian government-controlled gas company, a partner.

As for Ukraine, it received a much-needed economic aid package, as well as a reduction in the price it pays Moscow for natural gas. Putin announced the Russian government would purchase $15 billion in Ukrainian government bonds. He said the aid was being granted without any preconditions. The first $3 billion was scheduled to be transferred on Dec. 24.

Gazprom agreed to give the Ukrainian government's natural gas importer Naftogaz more time to pay its $1.3 billion debt and promised not to demand advance payments for future gas shipments. In addition, Gazprom slashed the price Ukrainians will pay for natural gas from over $400 per thousand cubic meters (the highest price in Europe) to $268.5. Reducing the price of gas by one-third gives the deal the boost that is needed to win the support of the Ukrainian populace.

In all likelihood, Gazprom will not lose money, despite the deep discount. Faced with price disputes throughout 2013, Ukraine had reduced the quantities it purchased from Russia by one-third. If gas purchases now return to 2012 levels, Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimates Gazprom's core profit will increase 1.5 percent.

The price cut is also the leash by which Putin keeps Ukraine in line. Russia's president added that the drop might be temporary. In other words, any move to resume relations with Brussels could easily result in a return to the previous price.

James J. Coyle is a professor and the director of Global Education at Chapman University and chair of the Eurasian Committee of the Pacific Council on International Policy.

Protesters put Ukraine on edge

Protesters put Ukraine on edge

By JAMES J. COYLE / For the Register

Published: Dec. 3, 2013 Updated: 2:28 p.m.

PARESH NATH / CAGLE CARTOONS

The largest crowds in Ukraine's history descended Sunday onto Independence Square, scene of the 2004 Orange Revolution. Demonstrators closed off the city center, using Christmas trees, city benches, metal fences and barricades. Protestors occupied City Hall and the trade union headquarters.

Kiev was not the only forum for unrest: demonstrations took place throughout the country, including in President Viktor Yanukovych's home town of Donetsk. Former interior minister Yuriy Lutsenko said what was happening was not a protest, but another revolution.

The government is in disarray: at least two parliamentarians from the ruling Party of Regions have resigned, as well as the chief of the presidential administration staff. The Kiev chief of police attempted to resign but was slapped with a suspension. The president is considering declaring a state of emergency, while the parliament is considering curtailing his powers.

It didn't have to be this way. On Thursday and Friday in Vilnius, Lithuania, the European Union welcomed Georgia and Moldova into the EU's Eastern Partnership.

Ukraine was supposed to be accepted as well, but the cabinet canceled the country's preparations to sign an association agreement after coming under heavy pressure from Moscow. The citizenry was outraged. Opposition parliamentarian Arseniy Yatsenyuk charged the ruling party with hindering Ukraine's movement towards the EU.

President Yanukovych had little room to maneuver. Even though he had been negotiating with the European Union for months, the odds have always favored his alignment with Moscow. Russia supplies Ukraine with 60 percent of its natural gas, and the two countries have been squabbling for months over price for the commodity. The EU has pledged to sell Ukraine natural gas through a reverse flow pipeline from Slovakia, but the quantities are insufficient to replace Russian gas. Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov offered a carrot: cheaper gas if Kiev halts free trade talks with Europe.

Russia is not afraid to also use a stick: it cut off natural gas flows in the winters of 2006 and 2009, and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev threatened tariffs on the importation of Ukrainian goods to Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, if the country aligned with the West. Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov subsequently told the parliament this would cost the country 400,000 jobs.

Yanukovych is trying to keep his options open, stating he has not abandoned the idea of joining the European Union someday. Equally telling, he has not agreed immediately to joining the rival, Moscow-backed Eurasian Customs Union.

These half measures have not appeased the crowds, however, who are demanding his resignation. Ukraine and Russia are supposed to set the natural gas price for 2014 in the next two weeks: a strong enough price cut might shore up Yanukovych's support – if the news doesn't arrive too late.

James J. Coyle is the director of Global Education at Chapman University and is the chair of the Eurasian committee of the Pacific Council on International Policy. He has also held various positions in the federal government, including director of Middle East studies at the U.S. Army War College.

Ukraine: Why buy when you can rent?

Ukraine and Russia may be on the verge of a compromise that grants Gazprom control over the Ukrainian pipeline system, while allowing President Viktor Yanukovych to keep his promise not to sell the asset to the Russians.  Ukraine may grant Gazprom use of the pipelines on a long-term lease.

In a live television program "Dialogue with the Nation," that was aired in February 2013, President Yanukovych floated the idea of renting out the pipeline system.  He continued to complain about the high price the country was paying Gazprom for natural gas under the "take or pay" contract negotiated by former Premier Yulia Tymoshenko, but rejected Gazprom's condition for lowering the price:  sale of the pipeline system.  Yanukovych was stuck between a rock and a hard place, however, in that he also rejected an International Monetary Fund (IMF) demand that Ukraine raise domestic gas prices before qualifying for a $15 billion loan.

Yanukovych traveled to Russia on March 4, and met Russian President Vladimir Putin for several hours.  At the conclusion, the news agency Unian reported the two sides were close to a deal in which the price of gas would be lowered from $430 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) to $260 per tcm, in return for which Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrayiny would form a joint venture that would rent the pipeline system.

No formal announcement was made, however, because the two sides remain divided on including the European Union in the joint venture.  Ukraine supports a European presence, while the Russians would prefer a bilateral arrangement.  In May, Ukrainian Energy Minister Eduard Stavytsky and EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger discussed a potential trilateral arrangement.  ""Ukraine is really trying to consider its geopolitical situation and to establish a gas hub, so we will be able to do spot purchases in central Europe," Stavytsky told reporters.  He estimated it would take $550 million to modernize the Ukrainian infrastructure.  Oettinger said he believed EU firms were willing to buy the ageing system.

The two sides have been skirmishing over the pipeline for sometime.  Ukraine has unilaterally reduced the importation of Russian gas, and in November 2012 began to import gas from Hungary to take its place.  Russia retaliated by presenting Ukraine with a bill for $7 billion for gas Ukraine was obligated to purchase.  Russia has also threatened to build a second Yamal pipeline to divert gas deliveries from the Ukrainian route.

Alexei Miller, head of Gazprom, said he was not worried about Ukrainian attempts to purchase gas from Europe on the spot market, because the spot price was rising.  "The price for Russian gas, which is being supplied to Ukraine, is significantly lower than the spot price, which has settled in continental Europe," he told reporters.  "Ukraine will not be able to bear the spot prices."

In late April 2013, the Ukrainian government introduced a bill in parliament that would allow the sale or lease of Naftogaz.  Kommersant reported Ukrainian authorities were prepared to allow Gazprom to control the main gas pipeline, while the Ukrainian East European fuel and energy company (VETEK) would run local gas distribution.  Valery Yazev, Russian State Duma first deputy for natural resources, predicted a compromise might be found.  Faced with a new arrangement with lower fuel prices, or losing the Ukrainian contract entirely, Yazev predicted Russia would reduce the gas price to $260-$280 per tcm.

In anticipation of a deal being struck, accountants performed an appraisal of the gas network, and valued it at between $26 and $29 billion.  Ukraine is ready to go the the altar, but is still waiting for a bridegroom.