An Unlikely Peacemaker: Will The Pope Bring Resolution In The Caucasus?

Featured in The Daily Caller on April 27, 2016. To access the original article, click here.

Hope for peace may be coming to the Caucasus. The Holy See has announced Pope Francis has accepted the invitation of the Catholicos of all Armenians, His Holiness Karekin II, to visit Armenia in June. The pope is also scheduled to visit Georgia and Azerbaijan on September 30-October 2 at the invitation of the governments of those states.

The papal visits could not come at a more important time. On April 2, fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan broke out on the contact line between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces. Over 75 soldiers and many civilians were killed in the worst outbreak of violence since the two sides signed a ceasefire in 1994. The Minsk group, and two of its co-chairs France and the United States, failed to restore the peace. The only effective movement was from the third co-chair, Russia, acting in a unilateral capacity. This is unfortunate.

The Minsk group is the negotiating body charged by the international community to negotiate a peace between the two sides. While it is strong in international representation, its influence is weak in the region. The outline of that peace has been known — and accepted by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia — since 2007. The “Madrid Principles” call for the following:

• Return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control;

• An interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance;

• a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh;

• future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will;

• the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and

• international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.

Russia has considerable weight in the area. It owns a large, 5000-man military base in Armenia, and sells weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. “Beyond all doubt, we are interested — maybe more than the other foreign partners of these two countries — in this conflict being settled as soon as possible,” said Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov.

Russia carries considerable baggage, however; primarily because of its support to separatists in neighboring Georgia, as well as in Moldova and Ukraine. The West should share the diplomatic lead, because Western interests are at stake. The area is a geopolitical tinderbox:  wedged between Turkey, Russia and Iran, this area could easily become a proxy war between any of these contending forces. Oil and gas pipelines running from Azerbaijan westwards bypassing both Russia and Iran offer Europe an alternative to the Russian energy monopoly. The countries are an easy day’s drive from Moscow, and sit astride the new Silk Road to Central Asia.

A lasting peace will not be easy to achieve. Negotiators have been arguing about various interpretations of the Madrid principles for almost a decade. The problem is a lack of mutual trust between the two sides. The current generation of fighters has inherited the conflict from their forbearers.

The current conflict began in 1988, in the ashes of the imploding Soviet Union. Fighting killed 30,000, and displaced almost a million, mostly Azerbaijanis. Both sides have suffered: Azerbaijan has lost 20 percent of its internationally recognized territory, and Armenia has lost the chance to share in the area’s economic development. The energy pipeline, whose most direct route from the Caspian would have taken it through Armenia, was routed through Georgia. Today, Georgia collects money from the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan in two forms: transit fees and tax revenues from the country’s largest taxpayer. By contrast, Armenia had to sell its energy distribution network to the Russians, to stay financially afloat.

The United States and France need to be more actively involved to protect the West’s interests in the peace process.  Lacking any movement from the White House or the Elysee Palace, however, a visit from the Supreme Pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church is a good second choice.

Creating Civil Wars is Russian Foreign Policy

Featured in Stars and Stripes on March 24, 2016. To access the original article, click here.

Russia is increasing its presence in Syria, while its efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the impasse grind to a halt. T-90 main battle tanks with explosive armor, only previously deployed in Chechnya and Ukraine, have been spotted outside of Aleppo. Reuters reports seven T-90s are at the Russian airfield in Latakia. Russia took over the main international airport in Damascus last year, and began airlifting tons of supplies, soldiers and armaments into the country, according to Business Insider. President Vladimir Putin confirmed in December that Russia is providing support to the Free Syrian Army.

“We support it from the air, as well as the Syrian army, we assist them with weapons, ammunition and provide material support,” he said.

This is part of a long pattern of Russian expansion of its military reach since the fall of the Soviet Union.

In March 1992, elements of the Russian 14th Army sided with separatists to oppose the central government of Moldova’s efforts to exert sovereignty on the ethnically Russian enclave of Transnistria. Russian officers trained the Transnistrian defense forces, and transferred weaponry to them. The separatist regime engaged in ethnic cleansing, leading to 25,000 Moldovans becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs). Russia then engineered a cease-fire patrolled by predominantly Russian peacekeepers, and the 14th Army remains on Transnistrian soil.

From 1991 to 1993, when Azerbaijan faced a war of occupation by neighboring Armenia, Russia put its entire weight behind pro-Russian Armenia against pro-Western Azerbaijan. This support allowed Armenia to occupy the Nagorno-Karabakh region as well as seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan. During the war, in February 1992, Russia’s 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment surrounded the Azerbaijani town of Khojaly, while Armenians massacred the residents. Moscow said the Russians who had been involved in this action were “volunteers.”

By 1993, the Russian 7th Army was already protecting Armenia’s borders. Russia then arranged to be a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, which has mediated Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks for decades without any results. Azerbaijan houses approximately 600,000-1,000,000 IDPs expelled from its occupied regions. For Russia, however, the continuing unrest provides an excuse for maintaining 3,000 troops at the 102nd Military Base, north of Yerevan, Armenia.

Russian forces supported Abkhazian separatists in their fight with the Georgian government in 1992. Human Rights Watch reported, “The conflict in Abkhazia was heightened by the involvement of Russia, mostly on the Abkhaz side, especially during the war’s initial stages. … Russian arms found their way into Abkhaz hands, Russian planes bombed civilian targets in Georgian-controlled territory, Russian military vessels, manned by supporters of the Abkhaz side, were made available to shell Georgian-held Sukhumi, and at least a handful of Russian-trained and Russian-paid fighters defended Abkhaz territory in Tkvarcheli.”

Human Rights Watch later interviewed a group of six armed Russians in Abkhazia who admitted they had been brought to the conflict area on Russian helicopters, were all former KGB and Spetznaz forces, had been fighting Georgian troops, had previously been fighting in Transnistria, and had begun in Moscow as a group of 30 “experienced, disciplined, Russian professionals.” They then denied being members of Russian government forces, but said they were “independent, patriotic forces.” (It was one of the earliest examples of the “little green men” made famous in the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea.) The result: a cease-fire patrolled by Russian peacekeepers.

This led to devastating results in 2008, when the Russian army intervened in Abkhazia and Ossetia to “restore the peace.” Georgia cares for approximately 300,000 IDPs. Russia is one of three parties involved in the Geneva peace talks. Today, Russian troops remain in these separatist areas, on soil recognized by the international community as Georgian, without the permission of the Georgian government. Russia also recognizes these areas as independent states.

In 2014, Russian forces stationed at the Russian naval station in Crimea surged out of their base in uniforms without insignia, to forcibly evict Ukrainian forces from their own territory. Russian “volunteers” have fought on the side of separatists in eastern Ukraine, and these separatists are armed with Russian tanks, anti-aircraft missiles and personnel carriers. Crater analysis shows that mortar rounds and missiles fired in support of the separatists have their origins inside Russia itself.

Russia has now annexed Crimea, and called for diplomacy to solve the crisis it created in eastern Ukraine. It is a cosponsor of the Minsk talks. Today, Russian troops are stationed in Crimea, and Putin has threatened to introduce Russian troops overtly into eastern Ukraine to “protect” the citizenry.

The pattern is clear: Russian military support for a side in a civil war contributes to unrest, and then Russian diplomatic efforts keep the conflict simmering. The continuing problems justify maintaining a Russian troop presence.

In all these instances, Russian military interventions and/or peace efforts have led to a continued expansion of Russian power and influence. America and its allies in Syria need to learn from history, and not just repeat it.

James J. Coyle, director of Chapman University’s Center for Global Education, is former director of Middle East studies at the U.S. Army War College.

James J. Coyle: We don't have a strategy yet

Published in the Orange County Register on September 10, 2014. To access the original article, click here.

Two and a half years after President Barack Obama ended American military involvement in Iraq, the United States has resumed “limited” air operations in that country. American war planes bombed forces of the Islamic State threatening the Kurdish enclave in the north. The White House is at a loss to explain this tacit admission that the Obama administration’s “success” in withdrawing American troops did not protect American interests in the area.

The President does not know the next step to take. Speaking at a news conference, he admitted “We don’t have a strategy yet.” The lack of planning is a surprise, as a former Pentagon official told Fox news that the President had been given detailed and specific intelligence about the rise of the Islamic state on multiple occasions, and for over a year. The former official described the information as strong and “granular” in detail.

The President’s words may well be his foreign policy epithet. Without considering the potential outcome, the United States stood on the side line when the Muslim Brotherhood replaced decades-old allies in Tunisia and Egypt. Our air force flew ninety percent of the sorties over Libya that resulted in the overthrow of the Gadhafi regime, the eventual murder of our Ambassador, and the current occupation of the US embassy in Tripoli.

Syria is in flames with 150,000 dead in their civil war. That is the equivalent to the death count of 50 World Trade Centers, or 75 Pearl Harbors. The only local group strong enough to confront the Islamic State is the government of Syria, the overthrow of which the US is committed. Iraq is teetering on the edge of a total breakup. In Afghanistan, the Taliban is waiting for America’s withdrawal to retake the country, while the Afghan government cannot choose a successor. Russia has annexed the Crimea and has invaded eastern Ukraine with over 1,000 troops. There is shooting on the cease fire line between Armenia and Azerbaijan. China is making territorial claims in the South China Sea that puts it in conflict with American allies. An ebola outbreak in Africa has infected 3,000 people, killing half. The World Health Organization says the world response to the illness has been inadequate, and the epidemic could spread. Boko Haram is seizing territory in northern Nigeria.

American policy is adrift. The United States remains the sole superpower in the world, with more military and economic might than any other country. For some reason, however, the White House is reacting to events instead of taking charge of them.

The creation of a national security strategy is a simple process to explain, and a difficult process to implement. One must identify American interests in the area. If there are no interests, the strategy should dictate that the United States steer clear. If there are interests, however, the next step is to identify at what point America will employ its levers of national power: military, political, economic, and ideological. The government needs to be clear on the ends, ways and means to be employed to safeguard the U.S.’s interests. They must determine that implementation of that strategy has an acceptable cost, and that the plan is sufficiently robust that it will actually achieve US objectives. The Obama administration published a strategy in 2010. It is time for another, one that the White House can use to protect our interests.

James J. Coyle is the Director of Global Education at Chapman University, and the executive director of the Caspian Research Institute, an online think tank.

Steps Toward Peace in the Caucasus

James J. Coyle: Steps toward peace in the Caucasus

By JAMES J. COYLE / For the Register

Published: Nov. 27, 2013 Updated: Dec. 2, 2013 9:27 a.m.

GETTY IMAGES FILE PHOTO

Last week, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan met in Vienna for the first time in almost two years.

The summit was important, because these two countries have been involved in a “frozen conflict” for two decades, ever since signing a ceasefire in 1994.

The discussions were held under the auspices of the Minsk Group, created by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and co-chaired by the United States, Russia and France. At the conclusion, the co-chairs issued a statement that the presidents had:

• Agreed to advance negotiations toward a peaceful settlement;

• Instructed their foreign ministers to cooperate with the co-chairs to build on the work done to date, with the aim of intensifying the peace process; and,

• Agreed to meet again in the months ahead.

In addition, the co-chairs agreed to hold working sessions in Kiev on Dec. 5-6, on the margins of an OSCE Ministerial meeting.

For many Armenians in Southern California with families and friends in the affected area, progress in the talks should be welcome news. Armenia's borders with both Turkey and Azerbaijan remain closed because of this conflict.

Today, Armenia is the poorest country in the South Caucasus and its population has decreased 40 percent since the conflict began in 1988. A settlement to the conflict holds the promise of greater prosperity in that country.

Azerbaijan has also felt the effects. Armenia occupies approximately 20 percent of what is internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory, in defiance of four UN Security Council resolutions. This has resulted in the displacement of one million Azerbaijanis from their homes.

The United States also has interests in the area – domestically and internationally.

Domestically, Armenians have been immigrating to the United States since the 1890s; today, 1.4 million Americans can trace their heritage to Armenia. They have a great interest in what happens in their ancestral homeland.

Internationally, America's major ally in the Middle East, Israel, gets 60 percent of its oil imports from Azerbaijan. European allies, including Greece and Italy, are patiently awaiting the construction of the Trans Anatolian Pipeline that will bring desperately needed natural gas from Azerbaijan to their countries.

A renewal of the fighting could threaten these important economic lifelines. In addition, approximately 40 percent of all air freight for our troops in Afghanistan transit Azerbaijan.

This route, called the Northern Distribution Network, will be crucial in the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan. Azerbaijani troops have fought side by side with Americans in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Plans for an Armenian-Iranian Fuel Pipeline

Construction is scheduled to begin in 2012 of an oil pipeline between the Iranian city of Tabriz and the Armenian city of Eraskh, reports the Agence France Presse.  The oil pipeline follows the opening of a gas pipeline between the two countries.  Armenia has been looking for an alternative to Russian energy imports since 2008, when Russian supplies were interrupted during the Russian-Georgia conflict.

Armenian energy minister Armen Movsisian told a news conference in February that "The diversification of energy sources is a guarantee of our country's eenergy security.  The pipeline will provide the country with stable fuel imports."

The AFP article states the pipeline will be completed in 2013, and is scheduled to deliver 1.5 million liters a day of Iranian gasoline and diesel fuel.  Armenia will pay $100 million for its share of the construction costs.

While Iran may look upon these energy links to Armenia as symbolic of it having non-Muslim friends willing to ignore sanctions, the Armenian motives appear more basic.  Both Russia and Iran support Armenia in its conflict with neighboring Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, so diversification of sources should not be considered as either favoring Iran or slighting Russia.  It appears, instead, exactly what it says it is:  an effort to make sure that it will have a fuel supply regardless of what happens with its neighbors.

Will Azerbaijan Control Natural Gas to Armenia?

Rumors continue to swirl around the possibilitity that Azerbaijan will purchase the Georgian pipeline that provides Armenia with Russian natural gas. This blog has previously reported on Georgian efforts to privatize the pipeline, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR)'s interest in buying the pipeline, and Georgia's efforts to maintain peace with its neighbors by stating it would only sell 10% of the pipeline--thereby depriving a buyer of the ability to choke off Armenian fuel supplies.

With Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze (left) visiting Baku, speculation about the proposed sale have again arisen. SOCAR President Rovnag Abdullayev stated on January 14 that his company remained interested in using the pipeline to export Azerbaijani gas to the shores of the Black Sea. http://news.am/eng/news/44602.html SOCAR spokesman Nizammedin Guliyev confirmed that talks with Georgia on the subject were continuing, but there was no timeline to the talks. Guliyev's remarks were confirmed by Georgian energy minister Aleko Khetaguri http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-15/azerbaijan-and-georgia-in-talks-over-privatization-of-pipeline.html.

Despite the reports, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Nino Kalandadze sought to distance the Foreign Minister from the subject. In an official briefing on 17 January, he stated that Vashadze would not be discussing the proposed takeover during his visit. "At the moment the issue is not on the agenda," said Kalandadze. "It is not discussed at a state level." http://news.am/eng/news/44777.html

The contradiction may be less than it appears. The Georgian parliament has already done its job by declaring that the pipeline was not a strategic asset. This opens the possibility of a sale of the pipeline. If there were any discussions taking place, they would would be with SOCAR, not with the government of Azerbaijan. So the deputy foreign minister's hedged denial may be on the mark: while discussions are not taking place at the state level, it would appear the discussions with SOCAR that the Georgian energy minister confirmed are ongoing.

Dr. James J. Coyle is available to speak to your organization or at your event. Please contact him at jimcoyle@verizon.net.

Will Gas End a War?

The Georgian main North-South gas pipeline--which is Armenia's primary source for natural gas--is on the bidding block. In 2006 Gazprom offered $250 million for the system. According to Vugar Bayramov, President of the Azerbaijani Center for Economic and Social Development, Georgia wanted a billion dollars and rejected the bid (Azerireport.com, August 23, 2010.)

Now a new bidder has surfaced. Bayramov said that the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) is preparing to offer $500 million for the pipeline. Such a move would give the Azerbaijani government control over the Armenian economy, and enable it to pressure Armenia to surrender its hold over Nagorno-Karabakh.

According to Armenian Energy and Natural Resource Minister Armen Movsisian, however, Georgia won't sell the pipeline at any price; and, even if it does, it would not threaten Armenia's energy security (Oil and Gas Eurasia, July-August 2010).

Movsisian may have a point. As reported by this blog on July 8, 2010, Georgian Prime Minister Nika Gilauri promised that if Georgia sold shares of the pipeline, that the government would keep controlling interest. Since the Azerbaijani $500 million is approximately half of Georgia's asking price, Georgia might only be willing to sell 50% minus one share to Azerbaijan.

On the other hand, Georgia might have reason to surrender control of the pipeline to Azerbaijan. It might reason that giving Azerbaijan the means to force a Russian ally to surrounder territory it is occupying as revenge for Russian occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and Ossetia, could be a strategic stroke to weaken the Kremlin's position in the Caucasus.

Dr. James J. Coyle is available to speak to your organization or at your event. Please contact him at jimcoyle@verizon.net.

Georgian Pipeline to Azerbaijan?

Gazprom might not be the winner in the competition to acquire the main North-South pipeline in Georgia, afterall. This blog reported last week that the Georgian government was putting the pipeline up for sale, and speculated that the cash rich Russian pipeline company might purchase the asset. According to the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, "observers in Tblisi say the new owner of the pipeline is 99 percent likely to be SOCAR." The deal apparently has been under discussion at the presidential level between Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev and Georgia's Mikheil Saakashvili for at least a month, according to Oil and Gas Eurasia (09 August 2010).

Such a development could change the politics of the Nagorno-Karabagh dispute. The Georgian North-South pipeline is the major source of Russian natural gas for Armenia, lying to the South of Georgia. Azerbaijan would have the ability to use access to the natural gas to bring pressure on Armenia to achieve a solution to this two decade-old conflict.

Dr. James J. Coyle is available to speak to your organization or at your event. Please contact him at jimcoyle@verizon.net.

Georgia Selling Gas Pipeline that feeds Armenia

Gazprom may soon own Armenia's main supply corridor for natural gas, increasing Russia's ability to control Armenian decisionmaking. According to the website Civil.GE, on July 6 the Georgian parliament endorsed a draft law to privatize state assets, including the North-South Pipeline. This pipeline delivers Russian natural gas to Armenia.

Georgian Prime Minister Nika Gilauri promised that if Georgia sold shares of the pipeline, that the government would keep controlling interest. The opposition tried to hold the prime minister to his word by offering an amendment that would limit the sale of pipeline shares to 49 percent. Had the amendment passed, it would have been impossible for the government to sell control of the pipeline to any outside investors. Parliament rejected the amendment, leaving open the possibility that either GAZPROM or a GAZPROM affiliate could snap up the pipeline.

Parliamentarians who backed the sale insisted that the pipeline would not be sold to Russia, but GAZPROM is not officially a part of the Russian government. GAZPROM has used its control of pipelines to increase the price of natural gas to downstream countries, and has also manipulated the gas supply when these countries take actions of which the Russian government disapproves.

Dr. James J. Coyle is available to speak to your organization or at your event. Please contact him at jimcoyle@verizon.net.

Clinton Trying to Resecure American Ties

Hillary Clinton and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev

Secretary of State Clinton has just returned from a five day, five country whirlwind tour of countries that Russian Prime Minister Demitri Medvedyev refers to as the Russian "zone of privileged interests." Specifically, Clinton called on NATO ally Poland and four countries of the former Soviet Union: Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. All are countries that counted themselves as friends of the United States two years ago, but have either become neutral or rejoined Moscow's orbit. If the United States is interested in access to Caspian oil, the Clinton visit is long overdue.

Against withering criticism from Moscow, Poland gave former President George W. Bush permission to build part of a missile shield there. The United States said the missiles were to defend against the Iranian threat; the Russians pointed out that Iran was nowhere near Poland. President Barack Obama sacrificed the missile shield as part of his efforts to reset relations with the Kremlin. Poland found itself questioning its importance to the United States and to NATO.

Georgia and Ukraine had been considering joining the NATO alliance, but Germany dragged its heals on their applications. Since then, Georgian territories of Abkhazia and Ossetia have broken with the central government in Yerevan, and their separation is enforced by Russian troops. The United States did not respond to this use of Russian force, and America's ally in Ukraine, former president Viktor Yushenko, was turned out at the next election. The new president, long-time Moscow ally Viktor Yanukovich, has presided over a parliament that has extended the Russian lease on their Crimean naval base and -- hours before the arrival of Secretary of State Clinton with a reminder that NATO membership is still on the table -- passed a resolution declaring Ukraine a non-aligned country.

Armenia is unhappy because the United States has not forced the Turks to open its border and for refusing to accept the Armenian occupation of Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan, by contrast, is unhappy because the United States encouraged Turkey to open its border with Armenia before the staus of Nagorno Karabakh was settled. Azerbaijan has signalled its unhappiness by signing new energy agreements with Moscow and with Tehran -- not with the West.

If one looks at where the region's energy resources originate, Azerbaijan, and how they get to the West, via Georgia and Turkey with the Ukraine as an alternative, it is interesting that the US has alienated large portions of the populations and governments of all these countries. Clinton's visit may be just in time; or it could be too little, too late.

Dr. James J. Coyle is available to speak to your organization or at your event. Please contact him at jimcoyle@verizon.net.